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This dissertation is a compilation of three essays.
The first essay uses longitudinal administrative data on teachers to investi-
gate the relative productivity benefits of acquiring general versus task-specific
human capital. Within a school, elementary teachers frequently change grade
assignments and I exploit the resulting variation in grade-specific tenure to sep-
arately identify the effect of general teaching experience and specific experience.
Using a value-addedmodel that controls for teacher fixed effects, I find that both
general experience and grade-specific experience improve teacher performance.
In addition to providing evidence that the productivity returns to human capi-
tal can be sensitive to seemingly small changes in task requirements, this study
furthers our understanding of how teachers improve with experience.
The second essay uses longitudinal administrative data from a large selec-
tive research university to analyze the role of peers and grades in determin-
ing major persistence in the life and physical sciences. In the physical sci-
ences, analyses using within-course, across-time variation show that ex-ante
measures of peer quality in a student’s introductory courses has a lasting impact
on the probability of persisting in the major. This peer effect exhibits important
non-linearities such that weak students benefit from exposure to stronger peers
while strong students are not dragged down by weaker peers. In both the phys-
ical and life sciences, I find evidence that students are “pulled away” by their
high grades in non-science courses and “pushed out” by their low grades in
their major field.
The final essay examines the effect of undergraduate course letter grades on
future course selection and major choice. Using a Regression-Discontinuity de-
sign, I exploit the fact that the probability of earning a particular letter grade
jumps discontinuously around letter grade cutoffs. This variation in letter
grades allows me to isolate the impact of letter grades on major choice and
course selection. I collect original numerical scores for 65 introductory courses
across 6 fields and merge this with administrative data including student-level
characteristics and transcripts. Since grading cutoffs exist throughout the dis-
tribution of scores, I am able to estimate local treatment effects at a variety of
localities to examine the distribution of treatment effects. Contrary to the find-
ings of the previous literature, I find no evidence that students respond to their
letter grades in terms of course or major choices.
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INTRODUCTION
The three essays that comprise this dissertation are all based in the eco-
nomics of education and examine issues of human capital acquisition.
In the first essay, I examine teacher productivity improvement and differen-
tiate between general and specific human capital. Using micro-level longitudi-
nal administrative data, I am able to construct exact task assignment histories
for every teacher in North Carolina and I use this information to determine
a teacher’s previous experience, both at her current grade level and at other
grade levels. By examining how general and specific experience help a teacher
improve, I provide direct productivity based evidence of the relative impor-
tance of general and specific human capital. This is a significant contribution to
the labor economics literature. The labor literature has previously inferred the
role of general and specific human capital from the assumption that wages and
marginal productivity are instantaneously equal, which goes counter to theo-
ries of wage deferring contracts or models of monopsonistic competition. I find
magnitudes that are similar to those found in the general labor literature despite
looking at productivity of teachers rather than wages in the general labor force.
In addition to contributing to a large literature in labor economics, this essay
is among the first that explores how teachers improve. Previous research has
established that teachers perform better as they gain experience, especially in
the first several years. My essay shows that teachers must be developing both
general teaching skills, such as classroommanagement, as well as skills that are
specific to a grade level such as curriculum familiarity.
The second essay is related to the first in that it explores human capital ac-
quisition, but rather than examine how workers develop human capital on the
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job, this essay explores why students choose to develop human capital in the
sciences. In particular, I explore the determinants of persisting in the sciences
conditional on having entered this field. A large fraction of students enter a
science field but do not complete a degree and this is a major concern to policy
makers. Science dropout is seen as weakening our global competitiveness in
addition to acting as a major obstacle in diversifying scientific fields along gen-
der and racial lines. Using longitudinal administrative data, I find that life and
physical sciences exhibit dramatically different patterns of dropout, but several
common factors influence persistence in the two fields. Relative grades are the
most important correlate with persistence, such that students with higher sci-
ence grades are more likely to persist in their scientific field, whereas students
with higher grades in other fields are more likely to drop the science major. This
paper also explores the impact of peer quality by comparing students across co-
horts. I find that students are less likely to persist in the sciences when they
take their introductory courses with other students who have a low likelihood
of persisting given their fixed characteristics.
The third and final essay is written with Joyce Main and more rigorously
tests the relationship between letter grades and major persistence documented
in the second essay. While the positive correlation between introductory letter
grades and persistence is clearly documented in the second essay, in addition
to previous research, this correlation may not be causal. Theoretically, a student
who cares about his or her GPA would rationally respond to low introductory
grades by avoiding a major; however, it is equally true that students who are
most committed to a particular major may also be those that choose to work
hardest in that major. These two theories are both possible explanations of the
relationship between grades and major choices and the policy implications de-
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pend critically on which story is correct. In order to separately identify these
theories, I collected exact numerical scores and merged these scores to adminis-
trative data that include transcript information. In this way, I constructed a data
set that includes both the letter grade a student received in addition to the exact
numerical score that she earned. This dataset allows me to test whether student
major probabilities jump discontinuously with each letter grade (as would be
the case if higher letter grades cause students to persist in a major) or whether
student major probabilities are a smoothly increasing function of ones numeric
score. I find little evidence that letter grades themselves causally increase the
probability of majoring in a subject.
Though each essay in the dissertation is a distinct entity, a common thread
of human capital runs through all three essays. The latter two essays are in-
timately related as they address essentially the same question of major choice,
albeit using different methodologies. The first essay on teacher improvement
breaks down a productive process rather than examining individual choices
and shows that productivity can be significantly influenced by the exact nature
of the human capital developed.
3
Chapter 1: How Do Teachers Improve? The Relative Impor-
tance of Specific and General Human Capital
1.1 Introduction
The degree to which human capital acquisition is general or specific has been of central con-
cern in the labor economics literature since Becker (1964). While early research was primarily
concerned with the degree to which human capital is specific to a firm or industry (Kletzer, 1989;
Topel, 1991; Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000), several recent papers suggest that the
most relevant specificity may be based on the occupation or the tasks performed (Poletaev and
Robinson, 2008; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Gathmann and Scho¨nberg, 2010). While this
literature has made great strides in understanding the degree to which human capital is transferable
across industries, firms, occupation and tasks, this literature measures productivity implicitly by
assuming that wages perfectly reflect productivity in every time period. This key assumption fails
to hold in the presence of wage-deferring contracts, differential monopsony power or efficiency
wages and thus, any of these phenomena could substantially bias estimates of the degree of human
capital specificity.
This paper provides new evidence of the relative importance of general and task-specific human
capital by examining productivity improvement among teachers. A large literature has established
that teachers improve with experience, but no previous study on teacher improvement has made the
distinction between general teaching human capital and human capital that is specific to a particular
grade level. Using micro-level longitudinal data, I track teachers, their grade-level assignments and
a direct measure of productivity over a 13-year period. Using these data, I estimate the productivity
improvements made by teachers as they gain general and grade-specific experience. This analysis
provides estimates of how the entire history of teacher task assignments interact to determine
current productivity.
The literature on teacher improvement has developed a high level of rigor in recent years thanks
to the availability of matched teacher-student panel data. Rather than relying on cross-sectional
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estimates which are likely flawed due to survival bias, researchers have used within teacher varia-
tion to determine productivity improvements due to experience. (Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek et al.,
2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2007) While this branch of research can establish
that a teacher’s performance increases over time, it is not able to explain how they are improv-
ing. If policy makers hope to increase the rate of improvement or lengthen it’s horizon, knowing
simply that teachers improve is uninformative. Ideally, researchers interested in helping teachers
improve would be able to identify “best practices” that inexperienced teachers fail to implement
and gradually learn. With specific information on what it is that teachers learn, policy makers and
professional development specialists might be able to provide training which emphasizes these
aspects and allows teachers to develop more rapidly. This paper provides a step in that direction
by identifying the extent to which teachers gain general teaching human capital such as classroom
management or grade-specific human capital such as curriculum familiarity.
1.2 Overview
This paper is the first to document two stylized facts.
1. Teachers switch grade assignments frequently within a school such that over a quarter teach
two different grades in their first two years.
2. Students who have a teacher with more grade-specific experience make larger test score gains
than students who have similarly experienced teachers with less grade-specific experience.
Fact #1 is critical to the implementation of my analysis because it suggests that sufficient varia-
tion exists between general and grade-specific experience. Fact #2 is suggestive of the main result
of this paper, namely that grade-specific experience is important to teacher improvement. While
suggestive, Fact #2 should not be taken as conclusive evidence that grade-specific experience is
beneficial to teacher productivity. The difference in productivity between teachers of equal general
experience levels could be the result of teachers improving with specific experience (as I argue),
but could also potentially reflect differences in grade assignment patterns across different types of
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schools and teachers. My analysis distinguishes between these possibilities by carefully consid-
ering the source of identifying variation and implementing tests for endogenous movement. First,
because of the possibility that unobserved teacher characteristics are correlated with grade-specific
experience, my preferred specification controls for teacher-by-school fixed effects and thus the pri-
mary findings are based on comparing a teacher to herself while at the same school. Second, in
order to test for endogenous movement, I examine whether changes in grade-specific experience
are predicted by current performance. I find no evidence that changes in grade-specific experience
are systematically related to a teachers current performance. The stylized fact regarding teacher
improvement remains true when placed in a regression context and importantly is robust to us-
ing fundamentally different sources of identifying variation. In particular the results are robust
to the inclusion of school fixed effects, teacher fixed effects, teacher-by-school fixed effects, or
teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects. Each of these specifications uses a fundamentally differ-
ent source of identifying variation (discussed in the Empirical Model section) and yet the results
are remarkably stable across specifications.
While the methodology used in this paper is in many ways similar to research using matched
worker-firm data, a few important differences are worth mentioning. First, the literature using
worker-firm data generally measures productivity implicitly by assuming that wages equal produc-
tivity in every period. This study uses a direct measure of productivity and thus avoids concerns
that wage deferring contracts or similar mechanisms create a divergence between productivity and
wages. Second a major concern in previous research is the possibility that workers switch to firms
where they are better matched and thus match quality may be correlated with acquiring specific
experience. The frequency with which teachers leave and return to tasks in my data allows me
to implement a novel strategy that directly controls for unobserved match quality. Furthermore,
because teachers frequently change grade assignments, I am also able to control for both the act
of switching itself as well as the number of switches each teacher has experienced. My preferred
estimates are thus identified from the specific pattern and order in which grades are taught.
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To address this question, I use administrative matched teacher-student data that follows each
teacher in the North Carolina public school system from 1995-2007. This data includes the exact
grade assignment for each teacher in each year, and since students are tested annually, the data
is well suited to estimate value-added models to assess teacher productivity in each year. Results
from a value-added model show that teachers improve with experience and the magnitude of these
improvements depends upon the frequency with which they are able to apply both general and
grade-specific human capital.1 In my preferred specification which includes teacher-by-school
fixed effects, grade-specific experience is found to be approximately 50% as important as general
experience for benefiting student math scores. There is little evidence that grade-specific experi-
ence benefits student reading scores. One potential explanation for why grade-specific experience
benefits math but not reading is that in North Carolina the reading objectives are constant for third
through fifth grade whereas the math objectives change each year.
This study’s contributions are threefold. First, it provides direct empirical evidence that within
an occupation, task-specific human capital acquisition can significantly affect productivity. Sec-
ond, it overcomes many of the econometric concerns in previous research by examining an occupa-
tion where task assignments are the norm rather than the exception. Lastly, the results of this paper
provide a more nuanced understanding of how teachers improve and can guide policy regarding
teacher grade assignments and professional development.
1Value-added models rely on there being no systematic student sorting according to the teacher
characteristic of interest. While previous research such as Rothstein (2010) and Clotfelter et al.
(2006) show evidence of students sorting into classrooms, I find little evidence that this sorting
is systematically related to experience within a teacher. I explore these issues in detail in the
Identification Tests section.
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1.3 Literature
1.3.1 Task-Specific Human Capital
While there is a wealth of empirical literature devoted to examining the relative importance of
firm-specific and general human capital, relatively little research has empirically analyzed the role
of task-specific human capital. In a theoretical paper on task-specific human capital, Gibbons and
Waldman (2004) explain that “some of the human capital an individual acquires on the job is spe-
cific to the tasks being performed, as opposed to being specific to the firm” (p. 203). They argue
that task-specific human capital has broad applicability compared to firm- or industry-specific hu-
man capital, and task-specific human capital can theoretically explain phenomena such as cohort
effects, job design, and promotion patterns. Unfortunately, relatively few empirical studies have
examined the role of task-specific human capital, possibly because most longitudinal data lacks
descriptions of job tasks.
In two recent papers, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008)
examine task-specific human capital by examining worker transitions across jobs with different
task requirements. Both papers create metrics to determine the distance between jobs in terms
of the skills required. Using their metric, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) find that task-specific
human capital can account for up to 52% of wage growth. Similarly, Poletaev and Robinson (2008)
finds that previous research showing that human capital is specific to the industry (Neal, 1995) is
largely attributable to the return to specific skills.
In both Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008), the essence of the
identification is comparing individuals who move to a job with a new set of task requirements to in-
dividuals who move to a job with similar task requirements as their previous employment. Though
both papers focus on plant closings to plausibly assume exogenous displacements, both sets of au-
thors note that there is still the possibility that unobserved differences exist between workers who
move to a similar occupation (in terms of skills) and workers who move to a dissimilar occupation.
Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) attempts to address this possibility by using local labor market
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conditions as an instrument for job changes, while Poletaev and Robinson (2008) simply note that
their estimates are descriptive and should not be interpreted causally. An advantage of both Gath-
mann and Scho¨nberg (2010) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008) over my study is that the authors
examine displaced workers from many occupations whereas my study is limited to teachers.
Another study analyzes the role of task-specific familiarity in the context of financial analyst
forecasting performance (Clement et al., 2007). This paper uses cross-sectional analysis and tests
whether analysts with more experience analyzing firm restructurings are more accurate in ana-
lyzing future restructurings than are other analysts. Their paper has the advantage of examining
a narrowly defined type of specific experience and using a direct measure of productivity; how-
ever, because the data used is cross-sectional, unobserved heterogeneity across analysts cannot be
ruled out. Importantly, the results found in this study may be driven by differential attrition among
analysts.2
My paper is similar to Clement et al. (2007) in that my analysis is restricted to a single oc-
cupation and a narrowly defined “specific experience.” Also, I observe a measure of productivity
rather than assuming wages are equal to marginal product. Given the theoretical justification for
a divergence between wages and marginal products over the life course (Lazear, 1979), observing
productivity is a more direct test of the role of specific human capital. Unlike Clement et al. (2007),
however, my data is longitudinal and thus I am able to control for unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity.
1.3.2 Teacher Experience
While the impact of many teacher characteristics is still debated, there exists an emerging con-
sensus that teacher experience positively contributes to student learning, particularly for younger
grades. Using data on middle school and elementary school students in Texas, Hanushek et al.
(2005) find that students perform relatively worse when their teacher has less than three years of
2If analysts that perform poorly on their first firm-restructuring assignment are fired, then cur-
rently employed analysts with previous experience are likely better on average than currently em-
ployed analysts with no firm-restructuring experience.
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experience. Rockoff (2004) finds consistent results using matched teacher-student data from two
New Jersey elementary school districts. Similarly, Clotfelter et al. (2007) and Jackson and Brueg-
mann (2009) use the same North Carolina matched teacher-student data used in this paper and find
that elementary teachers improve with experience, especially in the first several years.
The one exception to this consensus is Aaronson et al. (2007). The authors use data for ninth
graders in the Chicago Public Schools and find no evidence of teachers improving with experience.
One potential explanation for why the Aaronson et al. (2007) results differ from other studies is
that most previous research has focused on students in grades 3-8 whereas Aaronson et al. (2007)
considers high school teachers. For elementary grades, the fact that teachers typically teach the
same students all day makes it more likely that differences in teaching ability will be detectable
through student performance. Second, it is possible that the key skills that teachers develop as
they gain experience are useful for teaching younger students but not for secondary education.
Aaronson et al. (2007) is a clear exception to the literature given that in a meta-analysis of the value-
added literature, Harris (forthcoming) finds that eight of nine studies show evidence of teachers
improving with experience.
While many papers have demonstrated that teachers improve, the only paper of which I am
aware that explores a mechanism for how teachers’ on-the-job experience helps them improve is
Jackson and Bruegmann (2009). The authors show that teachers improve when exposed to higher
quality peers, thus demonstrating that part of teacher improvement is based on learning from other
teachers. My paper builds on this research by identifying the type of skills that are most important
to learn.
1.4 Data
I use longitudinal administrative data that links students to their teachers in the state of North
Carolina between 1995-2007.3 This data includes detailed information on student, classroom,
3This data has been extensively cleaned and standardized by the North Carolina Education
Research Data Center housed at Duke University.
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teacher, and school characteristics as well as a standardized measure of math and reading achieve-
ment for students in grades three through eight. For each student, the data include race, gender,
parental education, free or reduced lunch status, and test scores for each grade. Available teacher
characteristics include gender, race, highest degree earned, years of teaching experience, under-
graduate institution, and licensure test scores.4 Years of teaching experience is based on the num-
ber of years credited to a teacher for the purposes of salary calculation and thus should reflect all
experience in any district.
By matching teacher information to classroom records, I am able to identify the grade taught
by each teacher in each year. Using this information I construct a variable indicating the number
of years a teacher has previously taught her current grade assignment. Because middle and high
school teachers often teach multiple grades simultaneously, and because student test score data is
most complete for third through fifth grade, I restrict my sample to elementary teachers who teach
self-contained single-grade classes.
While the North Carolina data includes a link between student test scores and teachers, the
teacher listed is actually the proctor of the student exam, not necessarily the classroom teacher.
For elementary classrooms, the proctor is likely to be the classroom teacher, but to improve the
accuracy of teacher-student matches, I limit the sample to confidently matched students. Following
Clotfelter et al. (2007), Rothstein (2010), and Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) I consider a proctor
to be the classroom teacher so long as the teacher’s grade assignment matches the grade of the
proctored exam. In addition, I drop cases where a proctor administered more than half of his/her
tests to a different grade level.5
4This data is described in great detail in Clotfelter et al. (2007).
5In describing this data, Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) note that “According to state regula-
tion, the tests must be administered by a teacher, principal, or guidance counselor. Discussions
with education officials in North Carolina indicate that tests are always administered by the stu-
dents’ own teachers when these teachers are present. Also, all students in the same grade take
the exam at the same time; thus, any teacher teaching a given subject in a given grade will almost
certainly be administering the exam only to her own students.”
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To ensure comparability across years, I standardize all test scores by grade and year.6 In order
to implement some econometric specifications, I require a lagged test score in addition to current
test scores. Students who are only present in the data for a single year are therefore dropped.
The exception is for third graders, since the lagged third grade test is actually given to students
at the beginning of the third grade rather than in second grade. While the data includes complete
teacher data starting from 1995, complete student data is only available starting in 1997. I use the
1995-1996 period to calculate grade-specific experience, but only use 1997-2007 in regressions.
As discussed by Koedel and Betts (2008), achievement tests that contain ceilings may lead to
systematic measurement error since students near the ceiling are unable to make further gains. In
results not shown, I test for a ceiling in the North Carolina data by comparing a kernel density of
each distribution to that of the normal density and find no cause for concern.
1.4.1 Data Limitation: Grade-Specific Experience
The data include information on teaching experience accrued before the sample period; however,
my measure of grade-specific experience is limited to the sample time frame. For example, a
teacher with ten years experience in 2003 accrued the latter eight years during the sample frame,
but the data provides no information regarding the grades taught in her first two years (1993-1994).
Thus, I cannot exactly determine this teacher’s grade-specific experience for any year. In general,
I cannot exactly calculate grade-specific experience for teachers who have pre-sample experience.
I address this data limitation with two distinct approaches. The first approach simply restricts
the data to teachers who began teaching during the sample period and whose grade assignments are
thus fully observed. The second approach uses all teachers for analysis and imputes grade-specific
experience accrued prior to the sample period. This imputation is implemented by assuming that
the histogram of grades a teacher taught out-of-sample matches the average histogram of grades
taught by other teachers in her school. Each approach has benefits and drawbacks. Restricting
6Standardization is made prior to any data restrictions and thus the mean and standard deviation
of the analysis sample is not exactly zero and one respectively.
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the sample to fully observed teachers leads to an unrepresentitively inexperienced sample, while
imputing grade-specific experience leads to measurement error in an explanatory variable. Because
the measurement error introduced is not necessarily classical, however, the measurement error may
bias estimates and it is difficult to assess its direction and magnitude.
Given that imputation may lead to biased estimates, my preferred specification restricts the
sample to fully observed teachers though results are robust across both approaches. The fact that
this sample of teachers is unusually inexperienced is likely a minor issue since previous research
has found that most improvement occurs during the first several years (Rivkin et al., 2005).
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for both the full sample and the sample which is restricted
to fully observed teachers. As can be seen from this table, the restricted sample has considerably
less experience on average than the full sample.7 In addition, 25.6% of the full sample of teachers
have an advanced degree whereas only 13.1% of the restricted sample of teachers have an advanced
degree. The upper panel of Table 1.1 shows that restricting the sample to relatively inexperienced
teachers also leads to a slightly different sample of students. Students in the restricted sample
perform worse than students in the full sample and these students are also more likely to be a
minority. These differences reflect that fact that schools with weaker, minority students, have rela-
tively high teacher turnover rates and thus are disproportionately staffed by recently hired teachers.
While the restricted sample of teachers is clearly not representative of teachers as a whole, it is the
complete universe of recently hired teachers in the state of North Carolina and thus interesting in
and of itself. The next section provides a more nuanced description of the relationship between
grade-specific experience and general experience in this sample.
1.5 General Experience vs Grade-Specific Experience
In the absence of grade assignment changes, experience and grade-specific experience would be
perfectly collinear and I would only be able to identify a single effect. To investigate the prevalence
7By definition, teachers in the restricted sample must have less than 13 years of experience
whereas the full sample includes many teachers with 30+ years of experience.
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of grade assignment changes, Table 1.2 presents a transition matrix showing grade assignments in
year t+1 as a function of grade assignment in year t. This table demonstrates that over 25%
of teachers switch grade assignments after teaching third, fourth or fifth grade. This table also
documents that teachers are much more likely to switch to adjacent grades than distant grades.
Evaluating whether experience in adjacent grades is more beneficial than experience in distant
grades is hindered by the fact that relatively few teachers acquire experience in distant grades.
The frequent switching documented in Table 1.2 leads to a substantial divergence between
experience and grade-specific experience. Table 1.3 presents a cross tabulation of grade-specific
experience and experience for teachers in their first school. This table is restricted to teachers who
have not switched schools to demonstrate that the divergence between general and grade-specific
experience is not driven by school switching. Approximately 26% of teachers teach a new grade in
their second year of teaching, and less than a half teach the same grade five times in their first five
years teaching. This pattern continues in later years and suggests that it is possible to separately
identify grade-specific and general experience for this sample.
In light of the fact that this paper shows that some human capital is specific to the task, it is
somewhat surprising that so many switches occur. Conversations with principals indicate that in
addition to the costs of grade switching documented in this paper, several benefits to task switching
exist which may explain why teachers switch task assignments so frequently. First, switching
teachers allows for a flexibility in management that can be useful when teacher teams conflict,
lack diversity, or are uniformly experienced or inexperienced. Second, teachers who intend to
become administrators may eventually benefit from the breadth of experience which comes from
teaching a variety of courses. Third, it is possible that teachers grow bored with repetition over time
and although they are better able to improve student test scores, their enthusiasm for the subject
may wain. Finally, several principals indicated that they switch teachers to facilitate “professional
growth history”— helping teachers become well rounded by having them teach a variety of grades.
No empirical estimates of the benefits to switching are available from the literature since no
previous research has considered either the benefits or costs of teacher movement across grades
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within a school. Although this paper presents evidence that some of teacher human capital is
specific to a grade, the policy decision of whether to switch teachers must consider both the costs
and benefits of switching. A complete cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this paper,
however, in the Identification Tests section, I examine whether patterns of teacher switching may
be systematic in a way that would bias estimates of the return to specific experience.
1.5.1 Grade-Specific Experience and Student Performance
As a preliminary analysis of the effect of grade-specific experience, I perform simple mean
comparisons of average student performance. Figure 1.1 graphically shows changes in average
student test score gains as grade-specific experience varies. Each panel in this figure holds absolute
years of experience constant and graphs the average student test score gains for teachers with
various levels of grade-specific experience. These figures show that teachers with more grade-
specific experience perform better in terms of their students’ test score gains.
This relationship is especially clear for lower experience levels and is more pronounced for
math score gains than reading score gains. While these figures are suggestive, they simply reflect
raw correlations and by themselves cannot be interpreted as implying a causal relationship. How-
ever, in a later section I obtain a more controlled estimate of the impact of grade-specific experience
which confirms the implications of the simple average comparisons.
1.6 Empirical Model
To evaluate the impact of teacher characteristics on student outcomes I use a value-added model
(VAM) that controls for student characteristics, teacher characteristics, and several fixed effects to
predict future test scores. My preferred specification controls for the lag of test score; however, I
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explore the robustness of results across other value-added models in the appendix.8
Ai jgst = αAi jt−1gt−1st−1,t−1+βXi+δCi jgst+ρVi j+πDjt+ f (Exp jt)+g(Expgrd jt)
+S jt+S jt x f (Exp jt)+S jt x g(Expgrd jt)+ξg+ω js+φt+ εi jgst
(1)
Ai jgst is the test score of student i taught by teacher j in grade g in school s in time t. The student
characteristic vector Xi includes student gender, ethnicity, subsidized lunch status, and parental
education. Classroom characteristics such as class size and average peer characteristics (excluding
student i) are denoted by Ci jgst . The vector Vi j includes interactions between the student and
teacher ethnicity and sex.9 The vector Djt includes a control for whether the teacher switched in
the previous period and the total number of past switches a teacher has experienced. This model
includes grade, teacher-by-school and year fixed effects denoted by ξg, ω js and φt respectively.
Experience and grade-specific experience enter through f (·) and g(·).
Since teacher performance may be disrupted by school switches, I include a series of dummy
variables (S jt) indicating whether the teacher is in her first, second or third school. Also, since
the benefits to general or grade-specific experience may be specific to a school, I interact each
of these indicators with general and specific experience in order to allow a structural shift when
teachers change schools. The coefficients on the interaction of experience with whether a teacher
is in her second or third school provides an estimate of the extent to which experience benefits
are transferable across schools; however, I am hesitant to place much weight on these estimates
because of the strong possibility that school changes, like any job change, are endogenous or
reflect positive matching. Regardless, Appendix Table 1.12 shows that there is little evidence that
the returns to experience change as teachers switch schools, suggesting there is a limited role for
school-specific teaching skills. In other analyses (not shown) I include a cubic in school-specific
8The lagged test score VAM is used in many recent studies including Aaronson et al. (2007),
Kane et al. (2006), Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), and others. Controlling for the lag of test
score is found to outperform other value-added methodologies in an experimental validation study
by Kane and Staiger (2008). In their paper Kain and Staiger find no evidence that non-experimental
value-added estimates are biased, relative to experimental estimates.
9Dee (2005) shows that gender and ethnicity match may effect student achievement.
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experience directly into the model and find no evidence that human capital is school specific.
Given the possibility that school changes are endogenous, all estimates in this paper include non-
parametric controls for school changes rather than relying on correctly estimating school-specific
experience.10
As has been noted in previous research, measurement error in lagged test scores can bias es-
timates on all coefficients. I follow the procedure suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and
Todd and Wolpin (2003) and use the second lagged test score as an instrument for the first lagged
test score. Generally, this IV specification would drop any student who lacks three consecutive
test scores leading to an unrepresentative sample that disproportionately represents students in rel-
atively stable situations. I use the estimator proposed by Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) which
avoids this significant data restriction. Essentially the Jackson and Bruegmann estimator uses the
restricted student sample to estimate α using the double lag as an instrument for the lag of test
score. The estimate of α is then used in estimating equation (1) for the entire sample.11
While Rothstein (2010) demonstrates significant non-random sorting of students into class-
rooms, this will only bias my results to the extent that this sorting is correlated with grade-specific
teacher experience within a teacher. Furthermore, because I control for absolute years of teaching
experience, estimates of the impact of grade-specific experience will only be biased if students
are sorted into classrooms depending on the teachers’ grade-specific experience conditional on
a fixed level of overall teaching experience. I explore these concerns in the falsification section
and find little evidence that within a teacher, students are differentially sorted as the teacher gains
experience or grade-specific experience.
10Another possible approach would simply restrict the analysis to teachers in their first school,
thus avoiding the possibility of endogenous movement across schools. This approach creates a
sample selection issue however since teachers who never switch schools are likely different from
the general sample. In practice, this alternative approach yields very similar estimates to those of
the preferred model.
11See the online appendix of Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) for a proof of the consistency of
this estimator.
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Following Rockoff (2004), Aaronson et al. (2007), Koedel and Betts (2007), and others, I
model experience effects as a cubic polynomial. Given the nearly perfect collinearity between
general experience and year effects when teacher fixed effects are included, it is necessary to
assume that teacher experience has no impact on quality after a certain threshold of experience.
As in Rockoff (2004), Harris and Sass (2007), and Koedel and Betts (2007) I use 10 years as the
cutoff for general experience, however results are not sensitive to either polynomial choice or the
exact cutoff used.12
In order to test the sensitivity of results across various sources of identifying variation, I esti-
mate equation (1) with teacher-by-school fixed effects, school fixed effects and teacher-by-school-
by-grade fixed effects. To assess the relative merit of each of these identification strategies, it is
useful to consider a decomposition of the error term from equation (1). For notational simplicity,
I consider the error term from a model estimated at the teacher level; however, the intuition is
identical for the full model. Consider estimating:
Ajgt = f (Exp jt)+g(Expgrd jt)+βXj+θ jgt (2)
In this regression, Ajgt is a productivity measure, Exp jt is general experience, Expgrd jt is
specific experience and Xj is a set of teacher characteristics. Without loss of generality, the error
term from this regression, θ jgt , can be broken down as follows ( j denotes the teacher, g denotes a
grade, and t denotes time):
θ jgt = γ j+ γg+ γt +ν jt +ν jg+νgt + ε jgt (3)
12See Rockoff (2004) for a discussion and justification of this assumption. In practice, this as-
sumption is implemented by recoding the experience variable so that teachers with above ten years
of experience are made to have exactly ten years of experience. In the unrestricted sample, this
recoding leads to grade-specific experience exceeding general experience for the approximately
2% of teacher-year observations that have grade-specific experience above 10 years. By definition,
experience must be greater or equal than grade-specific experience so I impose a cutoff of 10 years
on grade-specific experience as well.
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To the extent that any part of this error term is correlated with grade-specific experience, estimates
from equation (2) will be biased. By including grade and time fixed effects γg and γt are completely
absorbed and thus need not be considered. When only including school fixed effects however, there
is reason to be concerned that γ j might be correlated with experience. There are many mechanisms
through which unobserved teacher quality may be correlated with grade teaching history within a
school. First, it is possible that teachers generally prefer to repeatedly teach the same grade, and the
best teachers are given this privilege. Conversely, it is possible that principals allow weaker teach-
ers to repeatedly teach the same grade since higher quality teachers can more easily overcome the
challenges of teaching a new curriculum. In addition to the possible endogeneity of grade switch-
ing, estimates of the effect of teacher experience may be biased if teacher exit rates are correlated
with unobserved quality. If weaker teachers leave teaching relatively early in their career, then
comparing experienced teachers to inexperienced teachers will lead to upwardly biased estimates
of the return to experience.13
To address both the concerns of differential grade assignment and concerns of differential at-
trition, I include teacher-by-school fixed effects. With the inclusion of teacher-by-school fixed
effects, grade fixed effects and time fixed effects, the error term θ jgt simplifies to become:
θ jgt = ν jt+ν jg+νgt+ ε jgt (4)
To assess the likelihood that this error term is correlated with experience, it is useful to consider
each piece separately. The first term (ν jt) captures changes in productivity over time not captured
by the controls for experience (functional form bias). So long as the return to experience is modeled
in a flexible fashion, ν jt is likely zero. The second term (ν jg) captures the unobserved productivity
match between teacher j and grade g. As predicted by a search model similar to Jovanovic (1979),
this term is potentially correlated with grade-specific experience if teachers are more likely to stay
teaching grades to which they are positively matched. The third term (νgt) captures global unob-
served changes in grade difficulty over time. Since all measures of productivity are standardized
13Hanushek et al. (2005), Boyd et al. (2008) Goldhaber et al. (2007) all find evidence that less
effective teachers are more likely to leave a school.
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by grade-year, νgt is likely zero. The final term (ε jgt) captures changes in unobserved productivity
within a worker-task match. To the extent that unobserved teacher-grade match quality change over
time, this can potentially bias estimates since principals may respond to match quality changes by
switching teachers.
Most papers assume that ε jgt is iid and are primarily concerned with addressing potential biases
caused by ν jg. In order to address this concern, many studies have focused on plant closings
which lead to a job change plausibly unrelated to an individuals’ current performance (Kletzer,
1989; Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995; Gathmann and Scho¨nberg, 2010; Kambourov and Manovskii,
2009). Furthermore, some studies have used local labor market conditions as an instrument to
address endogenous mobility towards positive matches. While these methodologies potentially
address endogenous mobility, they rely heavily on the validity of the instruments used or make
other assumptions.
The frequency with which teachers leave and return to grades in my data allows me to imple-
ment a novel strategy that directly controls for unobserved match quality. My approach includes
a teacher-by-grade fixed effect and thus the term ν jg is completely absorbed and disappears from
the error term. This approach is untenable in most analyses because within a worker-task, every
time general experience increases, specific experience increases by the same amount. Thus, spe-
cific and general experience are perfectly colinear within a worker-task, even for individuals who
switch jobs several times. The one exception is that when an individual leaves a task and later
returns to it, in the interim period, the worker gains general experience but not specific experience
and thus within a worker-task, the model is identified. Since my data includes a small number of
potential tasks, a large number of workers and frequent switches between tasks, the data is well
suited to estimating equation (2) with the inclusion of worker-by-task fixed effects.
With the inclusion of teacher-by-task fixed effects, ε jgt remains a part of the error term and
thus the key identifying assumption for this model is that to the extent that teachers are naturally
better matched to certain grades, this natural match quality cannot change over time in a way that is
systematically related to experience. Although including teacher-by-grade fixed effects effectively
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addresses biases caused by match quality, one limitation of this approach is that it is identified
primarily from teachers who switch grades and later return to the same grade.
1.7 Results
Results from estimating equation (1) are shown in Table 1.4 and Table 1.8. Consistent with
previous research, a teacher’s experience is found to positively impact student outcomes. While
controlling for number of years of teaching (general experience), grade-specific experience also
has a positive impact on student math scores.
Based on the restricted sample with teacher-by-school fixed effects, estimates for math scores
imply that a teacher who teaches the same grade for each of her first five years helps students
perform 0.140 standard deviations better than students with a novice teacher. If, instead, a teacher
teaches different grades every year for her first five years, she helps students perform 0.0915 stan-
dard deviations better than a novice teacher. In other words, a fifth-year teacher who always repeats
grade-assignments improves 52% more than a fifth-year teacher who never repeats grade assign-
ments.14 These magnitudes show fairly substantial improvement relative to the overall distribution
of teacher quality and are consistent with previous estimates of the return to experience. To put
these magnitudes in perspective, the difference between a novice teacher and a fifth-year teacher
is similar to the impact found for policy interventions such as large class size reductions in Project
STAR or movement to high performing charter schools. (Hoxby and Murarka, 2009; Schanzen-
bach, 2007) Estimates based on the full sample are similar to those from the restricted sample, and
are shown in the appendix.
Based on the restricted sample there is no statistically significant effect of grade-specific ex-
perience on reading scores. Estimates based on the full sample, however, show small statistically
significant benefits of grade-specific experience for reading scores. Regardless, the magnitude of
specific effects for reading is considerably smaller than for math and given the lack of robust-
14While a fifth-year teacher is considered for expository purposes, the benefits to grade specific
experience are roughly fifty percent throughout the improvement profile
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ness across data choices, I am hesitant to conclude that grade-specific experience benefits reading
scores. While I have no definitive explanation as to why grade-specific experience matters more
for math than for reading, one possible cause is the fact that similar reading skills are taught in each
grade whereas math curricula change dramatically for each grade. The North Carolina standard
curriculum “five competency goals” demonstrate this point. Between third and fifth grades, all five
reading competency goals remain identical for each grade whereas all five math competency goals
change for each grade (North Carolina Department of Education, 2009).
The second and fifth columns of Table 1.4 show that results are similar when using school
fixed effects. The model with school fixed effects has the advantage of utilizing a larger amount of
variation to identify the grade-specific experience effect, since teachers who never switch grades
still contribute to these estimates. However, given the multiple avenues through which school fixed
effects models could be biased, these are not my preferred specifications and are shown only as
a robustness check. Despite several potential avenues for bias, the magnitudes found when only
including school fixed effects are very similar to those when including teacher-by-school fixed
effects. A teacher who teaches the same grade for each of her first five years helps students perform
0.146 standard deviations better than a novice teacher. If instead a teacher teaches different grades
every year for her first five years, she helps students perform 0.086 standard deviations better than
a novice teacher. These estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the estimates that include
teacher-by-school fixed effects.
Models with teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects have the advantage of controlling for
unobserved differences in a teacher’s inherent ability to teach different grades; however, these
estimates are identified only for teachers who switch grades and then switch back to their original
grade. Since only 19.11% of teachers switch grades and then switch back, estimates that include
teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects are identified from a relatively small fraction of teachers.
Estimates that include teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects are fairly similar to estimates that
only include teacher-by-school fixed effects suggesting that grade-matching is a minor concern.
Based on estimates that include teacher-by-school-by-grade fixed effects, a teacher who teaches
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the same grade for each of her first five years helps students perform 0.168 standard deviations
better than students with a novice teacher. If instead a teacher teaches different grades every year
for her first five years, she helps students perform 0.091 standard deviations better than a novice
teacher. These estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the estimates that only include
teacher-by-school fixed effects.
Given that results are similar when including school, teacher-by-school, or teacher-by-school-
by-grade fixed effects, it appears that the exact source of identifying variation is relatively unim-
portant. That said, my preferred specification includes teacher-by-school fixed effects because it
controls for possibly important unobserved heterogeneity without severely restricting the identify-
ing sample.
1.7.1 Experience in Adjacent Grades
To the extent that age-specific teaching skills are important, experience in nearby grades may
be more relevant than experience in distant grades. To examine this possibility, I calculate a mea-
sure of “nearby” experience; specifically, for each teacher, I count the number of years in which
that teacher has taught either her current grade or an adjacent grade. This specification thus dis-
tinguishes between three types of experience: general experience, grade-specific experience, and
grade-or-adjacent-grade experience. Controlling for general and grade-specific experience, the
impact of grade-or-adjacent-grade experience gives the benefit of nearby experience above and be-
yond the benefit of general experience. For consistency, I model each type of experience as a cubic
and include the same controls as found in the primary analysis.
Table 1.5 shows the results for this regression when using various fixed effects. While the
point estimates from some specifications suggest that nearby grades benefit performance above
and beyond general experience, the results are not statistically significant in most specifications.
Furthermore, the coefficient for grade-specific experience ceases to be significant in my preferred
specification with teacher-by-school fixed effects. These results are not surprising given that Table
1.2 shows that teachers typically move only between adjacent grades and thus general and grade-
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or-adjacent-grade experience are highly correlated (ρ= 0.89). In addition, the estimates shown in
Table 1.5 are fairly sensitive to specification checks, providing further concern that collinearity may
be an issue. Rather than concluding that all 3 types of experience are not important determinants
of teacher performance, I view these results as indicating that too little variation exists between
these three measures of experience to be able to separately identify effects.
1.8 Identification Tests
When using teacher fixed effects, the effect of grade-specific experience is identified by two
different sources of variation. First, grade-specific experience diverges from general experience
whenever a teacher receives a new grade assignment. Second, conditional on the number of times
a teacher switches grades, grade-specific experience varies depending on the pattern of grades
taught and the order in which these grades are taught.
1.8.1 Test for Systematic Grade Switching
Since one source of variation is based on grade switching, estimates which use this source of
variation may be biased if teacher switching is correlated with expected performance.15 If teachers
are switched to grades in which they have less experience in years when one expects that they will
do particularly poorly, this may lead to overstating the importance of grade-specific experience.
To test whether teacher switching is related to expected performance, I estimate equations (5) and
(6). These equations test whether teachers are switched based on current performance. Since
it is impossible to directly measure “expected” performance, I test whether current performance
predicts whether a teacher is switched the following year. Since principals might consider raw test
scores in addition to test score progress, I define performance as absolute test score in equation (5)
and as test score gains in equation (6). I use a linear probability model (LPM) to predict whether a
teacher switches grade assignments between years. This model is run as a linear probability model
15More exactly, estimates may be biased if teacher switching is correlated with expected perfor-
mance conditional on all observables.
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rather than a non-linear model for simplicity and because empirically, predicted probabilities all
lie between zero and one using the LPM.
1(g j,t = g j,t+1) = ζA¯ jtgt stt+λ∑
g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1)−Ngs(t)￿￿￿+βEjt+ω js+ξg+φt+ ε jt (5)
1(g j,t = g j,t+1) = ζ∆Ajtgt stt+λ∑
g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1)−Ngs(t)￿￿￿+βEjt+ω js+ξg+φt+ ε jt (6)
The variable 1(g j,t = g j,t+1) is an indicator that is unity when teacher j repeats grade assign-
ments and zero when teacher j switches grade assignments. The variable A¯ jgst denotes the average
test scores for students taught by teacher j in grade g in school s in time t.16 The vector Ejt
includes experience and grade-specific experience in period t. Both specifications include teacher-
by-school, grade, and year fixed effects denoted by ω js, ξg and φt respectively. The variable Ngst
is the number of sections of grade g in year t and thus the coefficient λ captures the impact of
school-by-year changes in the demand for teachers of each grade.17 In performing this test, I am
primarily interested in the coefficient ζ because this coefficient reflects the extent to which teachers
are switched due to their current students’ performance.18
As can be seen in the first two columns of Table 1.6, there is little evidence that teachers are
switched based on current performance. A one standard deviation improvement in average reading
16These regressions are run at the classroom level because the tests aim to capture principals’
responses to class performance. When the same regressions are estimated at the student level, the
results are similar but the magnitudes of the estimates are considerably smaller.
17Hoxby (2000) exploits population variation to identify the effect of class size on student
achievement. Similarly, population variation leads to changes in the number of classes per grade.
When a particularly large cohort of students passes through a school, teachers may need to be
switched around each year in order to create extra sections for the large cohort. The expression
∑g
￿￿￿Ngs(t+1)−Ngs(t)￿￿￿ gives the total number of section changes in a school for a given year. I in-
clude this variable because as the number of section changes increase, I expect that teachers are
more likely to switch grades to fill those empty positions.
18If one teacher switches grades, another teacher will possibly need to switch grades as well,
thus standard errors are clustered at the school-year level. In practice, using OLS standard errors
or other clustering levels lead to similar results.
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test gains leads to a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of being switched. There
is a small negative effect from math gains as well; however this is not statistically significant.
The level of average reading scores and math scores are not statistically significant predictors of
teacher switching. Because there is some evidence that teacher switches are weakly correlated with
performance, my empirical model controls both for switching last period and the total number of
switches a teacher has experienced.
1.8.2 Test for Systematic Changes in Grade-Specific Experience
The second (and more exact) source of identifying variation is based upon the magnitude of
grade-specific experience changes. For example, when a teacher switches grade assignments,
this generally leads to a decrease in grade-specific experience; however, grade-specific experience
sometimes increases as a result of a switch.19 When controlling for both whether a teacher switches
and current grade-specific experience, estimates will be biased if next year’s grade-specific expe-
rience is correlated with expected performance. I test for this correlation by examining whether
current teacher performance predicts changes in next year’s grade-specific experience. It should
be emphasized that this test cannot detect correlations between grade-specific experience and ex-
pected performance that are unrelated to current performance. I estimate:
∆EXPGRDj,t+1 = γA¯ jtgt stt+βEjt+ω js+ξg+φt+δs jt+ ε jt (7)
∆EXPGRDj,t+1 = γ∆Ajtgt stt+βEjt+ω js+ξg+φt+δs jt+ ε jt (8)
The variable ∆EXPGRDt+1 denotes the change in grade-specific experience for teacher j between
time t and t + 1, s jt is an indicator for whether the teachers switched and all other variables are
defined as in (5) and (6). As shown in the third and fourth column of Table 1.6 there is no evidence
that grade-specific experience changes are related to current performance.
Based on the above tests, I conclude that conditional on switching, the resulting grade-specific
experience variation is not systematically related to previous teacher performance.
19In my data, 13.45% of switches result in increases in grade-specific experience.
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1.8.3 Test for Student Sorting
A major concern in using value-added models to measure teacher productivity is the extent to
which students are non-randomly assigned to teachers. Importantly, the non-random assignment
of students to teachers is necessary but not sufficient to bias estimates of experience effects. In
order for non-random student assignment to bias experience effects, student assignment must be
systematically related to teacher experience within a teacher. Just as random student assignment
is sufficient for eliminating bias in the presence of non-random teacher placement, randomly as-
signing teachers (according to their experience) is sufficient for eliminating biased estimates of
experience effects, in the presence of non-random student sorting.
Rothstein (2010) provides evidence that students are non-randomly assigned to teachers; how-
ever, since I include teacher-fixed effects, bias is only created if students are sorted differentially
over a teacher’s tenure. In addition, as demonstrated by Rothstein (2009), the lagged test score
model that I use has the advantage that it can account for dynamic systematic sorting based on ob-
servable past student performance. While dynamic sorting based on unobserved performance can
still bias estimates in a lagged model, specifications that include student-fixed effects and exclude
the lagged score are unable to even control for observable dynamic student sorting.
With this type of bias in mind, I test for systematic assignment based on grade-specific ex-
perience. Following Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), I test for this type of bias by examining
whether a future teacher’s experience is correlated with current student outcomes, conditional on
observables. While I confirm Rothstein’s finding that a student’s future teacher appears to have an
“effect” on current performance, I find weak evidence that this non-random sorting is related to
grade-specific experience.20
Table 1.7 shows the results of a regression in which the experience levels of each student’s
future teacher is included in the regression given by equation (1). This regression examines whether
20This indicates that my estimates of grade-specific experience effects are likely not affected by
non-random sorting, but individual teacher fixed effects should not be relied upon to evaluate that
specific teacher’s effectiveness.
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a student’s future teacher’s experience levels are correlated with a student’s current performance,
conditional on observables. As can be seen in this table, there is no evidence of non-random sorting
based on teacher grade-specific experience.
Because of the nature of the falsification exercise, students must be observed in three consec-
utive years to be included in the regression. Furthermore, the test requires that the future teacher
is fully observed in the sample (in order to calculate grade-specific experience) and thus drops any
student who’s future teacher has out-of-sample experience. This restriction leads to a considerable
sample size reduction which lowers the power of these regressions. It is possible that estimates
given in Table 1.7 would be statistically significant if the sample size was equivalent to Table 1.4.
As shown in the appendix, when using the full sample of teachers (with grade-specific experience
imputations), there is some evidence that students are sorted according to a teacher’s general ex-
perience level for math scores. Regardless, the magnitudes of these false experience “effects” are
quite small compared to the estimates given in Table 1.4. Based on this rather weak evidence of
student sorting, I conclude that it is unlikely that previous estimates are substantially biased due to
student sorting.
1.9 Alternative Interpretations
Based on the results shown above, I conclude that teachers likely benefit from both general and
grade-specific experience, however a number of alternative interpretations are possible as well.
First, it is possible that rather than benefitting from grade-specific experience, teachers suffer from
disruption. All specifications directly control for both a disruption indicator as well as a count of
the number of total disruptions, however, to the extent that disruption impacts long-term, but not
short term outcomes and does so in a non-linear fashion, my controls for disruption effects may
be insufficient. I find this interpretation a less likely explanation than a specific human capital
explanation, but am not able to definitively rule it out.
Another possible interpretation of the results is that teachers do not improve in general, but
simply become more familiar with the examinations and thus become more effective at preparing
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students for the tests. This interpretation could explain all past research on teacher improvement
and is difficult to disprove. If this interpretation of the results is correct however, it fundamentally
alters the optimal policy recommendations. Regardless, given that currently principals and admin-
istrators aim to improve test scores, a teacher that is more effective at preparing students for a test
might be considered more productive by the administration.
1.10 Conclusion
The fact that teachers improve with experience is commonly cited as one reason why teacher
attrition is problematic. This paper shows that frequently reassigning a teacher to a new grade has
consequences similar to teacher attrition because his or her grade-specific human capital is wasted.
While it is very difficult and expensive to affect teacher attrition through policy, improving teacher
grade assignments is more straightforward to implement. Based on conversations with principals
and teachers, it is apparent that completely avoiding grade assignment switches is unrealistic. In
cases where grade reassignments are unavoidable, however, principals should consider providing
teachers who are new to their grade assignment many of the supports provided to teachers who are
generally inexperienced.
More generally, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the applicability of human
capital is directly related to the similarity between past and future tasks performed. Thus, in
analyzing the effect of worker movement, the most relevant question may not be whether the
worker moves to the same industry or firm, but rather whether the new job requires similar tasks to
the old. Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) provide some evidence of the importance of task-specific
human capital in the context of job changes, but this literature remains under developed.
While the availability of panel data has been used extensively to make methodological im-
provements to previous research on teacher quality, relatively few studies have used the detailed
longitudinal data to analyze in detail how the past impacts the future. This study measures not
only whether a teacher was teaching five years earlier, but considers what she was teaching. Using
this dynamic measure of task assignments within a school, this paper separately identifies the pro-
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ductivity benefits of general and grade-specific human capital and finds that both are important in
determining the rate of teacher improvement.
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Figure 1.1: Average student test score gains by teacher grade specific experience: Split by
experience level.
Notes: As experience rises, the number of teachers reflected in each point sharply decreases and
thus the plots become increasingly noisy. For example, there are relatively few teachers with
exactly 8 years of experience and exactly 6 years of grade-specific experience.
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Table 1.2: Grade Assignment Transition Matrix
Grade taught in year t+1
Grade taught
in year t PK K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 and up Total
PK 82.7% 10.6% 2.7% 1.9% 1.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 100.0%
K 1.0% 78.6% 9.9% 3.7% 2.4% 1.4% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 100.0%
1 0.3% 9.6% 74.3% 8.2% 3.4% 1.6% 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 100.0%
2 0.3% 4.6% 7.9% 72.0% 9.2% 3.0% 2.0% 0.6% 0.6% 100.0%
3 0.2% 3.4% 3.8% 6.8% 71.8% 8.1% 3.6% 1.4% 1.0% 100.0%
4 0.2% 2.4% 2.5% 3.8% 7.4% 72.1% 8.7% 1.7% 1.3% 100.0%
5 0.1% 1.8% 1.5% 2.2% 4.8% 8.1% 75.4% 4.0% 2.0% 100.0%
Note: This table is restricted to teachers who teach in the same school in year t and t+1 and
are fully observed in the data.
Table 1.3: Grade Specific Experience by Total Experience
Grade Specific Experience
Experience 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 26.3% 73.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
2 18.1% 19.2% 62.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
3 14.8% 13.7% 16.4% 55.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
4 13.0% 10.5% 11.8% 14.7% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0%
5 11.6% 10.2% 8.5% 10.6% 14.7% 44.4% 100.0%
Note: This table includes teachers in the fully observed sample
who have not switched schools.
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Table 1.4: Impact of Teacher Experience on Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade-specific experience 0.0211* 0.0374** 0.0325† -0.0013 0.0083 0.0075
(0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0171) (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0166)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0033 -0.0071** -0.0039 0.0017 -0.0010 0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0025)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0002 0.0004† 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Experience 0.0453** 0.0347** 0.0436* 0.0624** 0.0321** 0.0647**
(0.0129) (0.0076) (0.0190) (0.0126) (0.0064) (0.0183)
Experience2 -0.0079** -0.0055** -0.0076** -0.0088** -0.0058** -0.0094**
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Experience3 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0004** 0.0007**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560874 560874 560874 558451 558451 558451
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at
class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is a standardized measure of test score. Only teachers who
begin teaching during the sample frame are included in this regression. Appendix Table 1.12
shows the complete set of coefficients from these regressions.
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Table 1.5: Impact of Teacher Experience in Adjacent Grades on Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade-specific experience 0.0144 0.0204* 0.0265 -0.0037 -0.0015 0.0012
(0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0197) (0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0192)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0016 -0.0037 -0.0017 0.0021 0.0005 0.0034
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0030)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Experience 0.0336* 0.0186* 0.0352 0.0513** 0.0216** 0.0495*
(0.0142) (0.0089) (0.0224) (0.0140) (0.0074) (0.0211)
Experience2 -0.0056* -0.0030 -0.0058* -0.0076** -0.0045* -0.0084**
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0026)
Experience3 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0005* 0.0006** 0.0004** 0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(Exp. in grd or adjacent grd) 0.0167 0.0331** 0.0073 0.0060 0.0211** 0.0140
(0.0103) (0.0086) (0.0214) (0.0098) (0.0070) (0.0192)
(Exp. in grd or adjacent grd)2 -0.0040 -0.0058* -0.0043 -0.0018 -0.0032† -0.0024
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0026)
(Exp. in grd or adjacent grd)3 0.0002 0.0003† 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560693 560693 560693 558268 558268 558268
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at
class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Only teachers who begin teaching during the
sample frame are included in this regression.
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Table 1.7: Falsification: “Impact” of Future Teacher Experience on Current Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lead teacher grade exper. 0.0037 -0.0040 0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0061 0.0008
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0177)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)2 0.0016 0.0038 0.0018 0.0031 0.0049 0.0034
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0051)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)3 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Lead teacher exper. -0.0001 0.0033 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0043 0.0007
(0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0162) (0.0149) (0.0167)
(Lead teacher exper.)2 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0008
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0044)
(Lead teacher exper.)3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 87959 87959 87959 87595 87595 87595
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered
at class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score in period t. Lead experience and lead
grade-specific experience correspond to the characteristics of student i’s teacher in pe-
riod t+1. All period t covariates are included in this regression, so this test is equivalent
to testing whether lead teacher characteristics are correlated with unobserved student
performance.
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A Robustness Across Value Added Models
The lagged IV model used in the paper is my preferred specification both because it has per-
formed well in experimental validation studies and because it can control for student sorting so
long as that sorting is based on past test score. For robustness, I estimate other common VAMs
in this appendix. Using the same variable definitions as presented in the paper, three commonly
estimated VAM models are laid out below.
Gains model
∆Ai jgst = βXi+δCi jgst+ρVi j+πDjt+ f (Exp jt)+g(Expgrd jt)
+S jt+S jt x f (Exp jt)+S jt x g(Expgrd jt)+ξg+ω js+φt+ εi jgst
(9)
Lagged test score model
Ai jgst = αAi jt−1gt−1st−1,t−1+βXi+δCi jgst+ρVi j+πDjt+ f (Exp jt)+g(Expgrd jt)
+S jt+S jt x f (Exp jt)+S jt x g(Expgrd jt)+ξg+ω js+φt+ εi jgst
(10)
Student fixed-effect model
Ai jgst = βXi+δCi jgst+ρVi j+πDjt+ f (Exp jt)+g(Expgrd jt)
+S jt+S jt x f (Exp jt)+S jt x g(Expgrd jt)+µi+ω js+φt+ εi jgst
(11)
The lagged test score model is identical to the preferred specification from the text except that
it does not instrument for the lagged test score. This model assumes that all past inputs can be
summarized by the lagged test score and it implicitly assumes that the effects of past inputs decay
geometrically. The gains model additionally makes the assumption that α = 1. One advantage of
the gains model over the lagged model is that it completely avoids the measurement error problems
of including the lagged score as an independent variable.
The student fixed effects model controls for unobserved fixed characteristics of students and
assumes that past inputs have no effect on future outcomes. Unfortunately, given my data, the
model with student fixed effects may be unreliable when estimated for the fully observed, restricted
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sample of teachers. This analysis is complicated by the fact that when I restrict the sample to fully
observed teachers, this severely reduces the number of students who are observed for two or more
years.21 As a result, while restricting the sample to fully observed teachers is broadly my preferred
specification, since it destroys the continuous panel structure along the student dimension, my
preferred student fixed effect estimates are based on the full sample of teachers.
Even when using the full sample of students however, one drawback to using the student fixed
effects model is that one cannot simultaneously control for grade fixed effects, year fixed effects
and student fixed effects (see Rockoff (2004) for a discussion). Previous research has simply
dropped the grade fixed effects; however, given that this paper’s focus is differences between
grades, the exclusion of grade fixed effects seems ill advised. Nevertheless, I report estimates
from the student-fixed effects model (excluding grade fixed effects) with the understanding that
the restricted sample estimates are identified off of very few students.
Estimates based on the above 3 models (as well as the preferred specification from the text) are
shown in Table 1.10. Results are extremely similar for the lagged model, the instrumented lagged
model and the gains model. When including student fixed effects for the restricted sample, grade-
specific experience appears to be much more important and the impact of general experience is not
statistically significant. The differences in results for the student fixed effect model could be due to
the exclusion of grade fixed effects or the controls for unobserved fixed student ability; however, I
find it most likely that the differences are due to the lack of repetitive student observations because
when estimated on the full sample of teachers, the student fixed effect model yields similar results
to the other models. Table 1.11 shows estimates of the same models for the full sample of teachers.
When using the entire sample, all four value-added models yield qualitatively similar results.
21If a student is observed for three years in the data, this student is only observed for three years
in the restricted sample if he/she has a fully observed teacher in every year. Only 16% of the
students who are observed for three years in the full sample, appear for three years in the restricted
sample.
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Table 1.8: Impact of Teacher Experience on Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grade-specific experience 0.0185** 0.0310** 0.0261** 0.0096** 0.0172** 0.0101*
(0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0047)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0024** -0.0036** -0.0032** -0.0015* -0.0022** -0.0016*
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0001† 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Experience 0.0303** 0.0278** 0.0222** 0.0175** 0.0194** 0.0181**
(0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0048)
Experience2 -0.0067** -0.0053** -0.0057** -0.0043** -0.0036** -0.0043**
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Experience3 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1835220 1835220 1835220 1827554 1827554 1827554
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at
class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. Teachers with out-of-sample experience are
included and the distribution of grades taught out-of-sample is imputed as laid out in the text.
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Table 1.9: Falsification: “Impact” of Future Teacher Experience on Current Student Performance
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lead teacher grade exper. 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0008 0.0025 0.0012 0.0026
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
(Lead teacher grade exper.)3 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lead teacher exper. 0.0083* 0.0077* 0.0083* 0.0047 0.0043 0.0040
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038)
(Lead teacher exper.)2 -0.0021** -0.0015† -0.0021** -0.0016† -0.0010 -0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
(Lead teacher exper.)3 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001†
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 815869 815869 815869 812774 812774 812774
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered
at class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is test score in period t. Lead experience and lead
grade-specific experience correspond to the characteristics of student i’s teacher in
period t+1. All period t covariates are included in this regression.
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Table 1.12: Full Set of Coefficients from Table 1.4
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female student -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.0043
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Black student -0.0206** -0.0200** -0.0197** -0.0385** -0.0438** -0.0377**
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Hispanic student 0.0229** 0.0186* 0.0239** -0.0036 -0.0056 -0.0021
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Parental education
High school dropout -0.0231** -0.0138** -0.0243** -0.0402** -0.0334** -0.0412**
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047)
College graduate 0.0183** 0.0090** 0.0193** 0.0101** 0.0017 0.0111**
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Student on subsidized lunch -0.0290** -0.0298** -0.0286** -0.0259** -0.0261** -0.0259**
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Limited english proficiency 0.1207** 0.1229** 0.1200** 0.1516** 0.1534** 0.1528**
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Student-teacher same sex 0.0050† 0.0055† 0.0053† -0.0066* -0.0071* -0.0066*
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032)
Student-teacher same ethnicity 0.0022 -0.0046 0.0009 -0.0101 0.0113† -0.0109
(0.0086) (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0091)
Class size -0.0051** -0.0032** -0.0050** -0.0036** -0.0018** -0.0037**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Teacher was switched this year 0.0142† 0.0209** 0.0182* -0.0009 0.0005 0.0033
(0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0076) (0.0066) (0.0081)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.12: Continued from previous page
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
Total number of times switched 0.0007 -0.0184** -0.0029 -0.0039 -0.0095** -0.0010
(0.0063) (0.0031) (0.0105) (0.0062) (0.0026) (0.0100)
Experience 0.0453** 0.0347** 0.0436* 0.0624** 0.0321** 0.0647**
(0.0129) (0.0076) (0.0190) (0.0126) (0.0064) (0.0183)
Experience2 -0.0079** -0.0055** -0.0076** -0.0088** -0.0058** -0.0094**
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Experience3 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0004** 0.0007**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Grade-specific experience 0.0211* 0.0374** 0.0325† -0.0013 0.0083 0.0075
(0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0171) (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0166)
(Grade-specific experience)2 -0.0033 -0.0071** -0.0039 0.0017 -0.0010 0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0025)
(Grade-specific experience)3 0.0002 0.0004† 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Second School -0.0152 0.0151 -0.0282 0.0703 0.0197 0.0848†
(0.0464) (0.0245) (0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0213) (0.0514)
2nd Schl X Exp. 0.0129 0.0015 -0.0270 -0.0233 -0.0122 -0.0477
(0.0230) (0.0205) (0.0317) (0.0228) (0.0179) (0.0316)
2nd Schl X Exp.2 -0.0013 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0078 0.0042 0.0100†
(0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0055)
2nd Schl X Exp.3 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0006† -0.0003 -0.0007†
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
2nd Schl X Grd. Exp. -0.0221 -0.0251* 0.0205 -0.0288* -0.0250* 0.0072
(0.0136) (0.0122) (0.0237) (0.0130) (0.0105) (0.0236)
2nd Schl X (Grd. Exp.)2 0.0042 0.0054 0.0033 0.0029 0.0047 -0.0022
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0041)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.12: Continued from previous page
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
2nd Schl X (Grd. Exp.)2 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Third School 0.3533* 0.2727 0.3720† -0.0071 0.1788 0.0172
(0.1697) (0.1749) (0.1946) (0.1813) (0.1486) (0.2185)
3rd Schl X Exp. -0.1880† -0.1005 -0.1814 -0.0449 -0.0760 -0.0549
(0.1023) (0.1033) (0.1184) (0.1073) (0.0897) (0.1277)
3rd Schl X Exp.2 0.0274 0.0140 0.0272 0.0077 0.0140 0.0054
(0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0195) (0.0163) (0.0222)
3rd Schl X Exp.3 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0003
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012)
3rd Schl X Grd. Exp. 0.0113 -0.0527 -0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0289 0.0076
(0.0361) (0.0321) (0.0512) (0.0362) (0.0277) (0.0511)
3rd Schl X (Grd. Exp.)2 0.0033 0.0150 0.0068 0.0053 0.0070 0.0105
(0.0107) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0119)
3rd Schl X (Grd. Exp.)3 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Peer Characteristics
Ave. Lagged math score -0.0313* -0.2573** 0.0240†
(0.0122) (0.0080) (0.0137)
Ave. Lagged read score 0.1059** -0.1570** 0.1673**
(0.0114) (0.0067) (0.0126)
Fraction female 0.0421* 0.0311† 0.0332† -0.0158 0.0212 -0.0273
(0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0189) (0.0181) (0.0154) (0.0189)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.12: Continued from previous page
Math Reading
Teacher- Teacher-by- Teacher- Teacher-by-
by- School-by- by- School-by-
Fixed Effects: School School Grade School School Grade
Fraction black -0.0319 -0.2291** 0.0041 0.0938** -0.1076** 0.1298**
(0.0219) (0.0200) (0.0231) (0.0216) (0.0171) (0.0228)
Fraction hispanic -0.0704† -0.2057** -0.0477 -0.1023** -0.1967** -0.0667†
(0.0376) (0.0320) (0.0397) (0.0376) (0.0296) (0.0396)
Frac. parent ed: Dropout -0.0150 0.0492** -0.0175 0.0261 0.0426** 0.0274
(0.0197) (0.0170) (0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0149) (0.0206)
Frac. parent ed: College grad. 0.0113 0.0096 0.0051 -0.0113 -0.0069 -0.0192
(0.0145) (0.0123) (0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0110) (0.0148)
Frac. subsidized lunch 0.0081 -0.0833** 0.0255* 0.0411** -0.0503** 0.0510**
(0.0116) (0.0109) (0.0123) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0122)
Frac. limited english proficient 0.1572** 0.0719† 0.1507** 0.2427** 0.0678† 0.2847**
(0.0433) (0.0391) (0.0454) (0.0439) (0.0363) (0.0464)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Observations 560874 560874 560874 558451 558451 558451
† Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Clustered standard errors
reported in parentheses
Notes: The dependent variable is test score. This table provides the full set of coefficients
for the regressions presented in Table 1.4. The exact coefficients for many variables in these
regressions should not be interpreted causally because as in Rockoff (2004), I do not attempt
to credibly identify the impact of exogenous changes in these controls and am only including
these variables to control for potentially confounding factors.
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Chapter 2: The Role of Peers and Grades in Determining Major
Persistence in the Sciences
2.1 Introduction
Lagging persistence in the sciences has been a major concern for policy makers over the past
forty years. In particular, much of the research and policy on this topic has focused on improving
the representation of females and minorities in science majors. While frequently lumped together
into the “science” category, students in the physical and life sciences exhibit dramatically different
patterns of major intent and persistence. This paper highlights the importance of disaggregating
the sciences into physical and life sciences, both in conducting research and implementing policy.
One difference between this study and much of the previous literature is the selectivity of
the school analyzed and the fact that it is a major research university. The findings of nationally
representative studies may not reflect trends affecting top universities and these schools have a
disproportionate impact. Much of the reason that policy makers are deeply concerned about science
graduation rates is that it is perceived to impair global competitiveness and reduce the potential
benefits of positive externalities associated with scientific research. In this regard, a selective
research university is a particularly important setting to understand trends and determinants of
major persistence because these students are disproportionately likely to contribute to scientific
progress.
Using administrative data from a large selective research university (LSRU herein), I examine
the determinants of entering and then persisting in physical and life science majors. Because
physical and life science persistence patterns are not yet well understood at selective universities,
I devote considerable time to descriptive analysis, particularly in examining gender and ethnicity
differentials. I show, for example, that failing to account for differences between physical and life
sciences may lead to spurious findings regarding the importance of gender because females are
over represented in the life sciences, where attrition is particularly high.
In addition to describing persistence trends, this paper investigates the impact of one’s peers on
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major persistence. Peer quality has been shown to be an important determinant of student perfor-
mance in a variety of settings (Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2009; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman,
2003). However, there is limited information regarding the influence of peers on major persistence
and choice. Recent studies using randomly assigned roommates for identification such as Sacer-
dote (2001) and Han and Li (2009) find no evidence of residential peer influence on major choice.
Instead of examining residential peer effects, I investigate the existence of peer effects in one’s
courses. For the physical sciences, I find evidence of positive peer effects in one’s core physical
science classes suggesting that classmates may have a larger influence on academic decisions than
roommates.
The importance of grades in determining course choice has been documented extensively (Bar,
Kadiyali and Zussman, 2009; Fournier and Sass, 2000; Sabot and Wakeman-Linn, 1991). Given
that grade inflation has disproportionately affected non-science fields, a grading gap has emerged
that provides students with an incentive to defect from the sciences. Furthermore, there is evidence
that females respond more strongly to grade incentives than do males, potentially exacerbating the
persistence gap between men and women (Owen, 2010; Rask and Tiefenthaler, 2008).
While these phenomena affect all sciences, there exists a large amount of variation in grading
standards within the sciences as well. In fact, for my data, the gap between average grades in
the life and physical sciences is nearly as large as the gap between life and non-sciences. In both
fields, I find that students are less likely to persist as their non-science grades improve and more
likely to persist as their own field grades improve. Furthermore, I confirm that females appear
more sensitive to grades; however, this differential sensitivity is limited to the physical sciences,
where females are a minority group.
Since many of the factors affecting persistence are similar in the physical and life sciences,
research analyzing all science majors together will in many cases arrive at qualitatively correct
conclusions. However, the large body of research on the gender persistence gap need be particu-
larly careful to distinguish between physical and life scientists.
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2.2 Data
For this study, I use longitudinal administrative data from a large selective research university.
This data encompasses the entire universe of this university, including the complete transcript
of courses and grades for every entering student from 1997-2003.1 These transcripts also include
unique course identifiers; thus, I can exactly identify each student’s peers in every course she takes.
Course identifiers are constant over time facilitating the inclusion of course fixed effects. The final
cohort (2003) is followed until 2008 when most (but not all) students have either graduated or
withdrawn. This transcript data is matched to admissions data such as SAT scores, class rank and
demographic information.2
Students entering this university are not representative of college students nationally. As shown
in column 1 of Table 2.1, 53.7% of students in this period are white, 4.6% are black, 16.1% are
Asian, 5.4% are Hispanic, 2.2% report two races and 17.2% of students fail to report a race or
ethnicity. Slightly over 50% of entering students are male. The average SAT score over this period
is 1358.2 and more than 75% of incoming students were in the top 10% of their graduating high
school class. 33% of students enter LSRU with credit for at least one college course and 24%
enter with credit for calculus.3 While this university is clearly not nationally representative, it is
fairly well representative of students who are likely to eventually perform top level research in the
sciences.
As part of the admissions process at LSRU, students are asked to indicate their intended major.
While students in the liberal arts sector of LSRU can list either science or non-science majors, the
majority of students at LSRU are admitted to a specific branch and must major within that branch
(e.g. students admitted into the college of engineering must intend to major in STEM). Of the
17,145 students who enter LSRU during this time period, 1,634 are either missing an intended
major or list “undeclared.” For all analyses that require an intended major, these observations are
1One exception is transfer students who are generally not included in this data.
2Unfortunately, course instructors have not been matched to student transcripts for this university and historical
faculty information is limited. A lengthy attempt to match professors to classrooms only successfully matched 30%
of courses.
3In most cases, college credit is obtained by taking AP/IB courses in high school.
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dropped.4 Of students who list an intended major, 39% intend to major in a non-STEM field, 37%
intend to major in the physical sciences, and 24% intend to major in the life sciences.
Columns 2-5 of Table 2.1 break out descriptive statistics by intended major. Students who
intend to major in the physical or life sciences are generally stronger students in terms of SAT
scores, incoming college credits and high school rank. The physical sciences are over 70% male
whereas the life sciences are over 60% female. Asian students are overrepresented in the physical
sciences whereas black and Hispanic students are under represented. Based on these minimal
descriptive statistics, it is already clear that the life and physical sciences attract different types of
students.
2.3 Empirical Methods and Results
Graduating with a science degree is the result of first intending to major in a science field,
and second, persisting in this field.5 I therefore first explore patterns of intended major and then,
conditional on intended major, I examine patterns of persistence.
2.3.1 Intended Major Choice
Since different races and genders may have different preparation levels on average, I use a
regression framework to better understand the type of student who intends to major in life or
physical sciences. Importantly, I am not using regression in an attempt to identify causal estimates,
but rather to refine the descriptive analysis. My primary question is whether the gaps between
genders and races documented above can be explained by differential preparation. To address
this question I use the multinomial logit function shown by equation 1 to estimate which factors
4Including these students and using an imputed major has little impact on results.
5While it is possible to switch to a science major after intending a non-science major, in practice less than 5% of
non-science majors transfer to become science majors at LSRU.
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contribute to declaring a life science, physical science or a non-science major.
P (y = j) =
e β
￿θj
1 + e β￿θj
for j = 0, 1, 2 (1)
Table 2.2 shows results from the multinomial logit regression where the choices are intending
to major in physical science, life science, or non-science. Consistent with the findings of Turner
and Bowen (1999), many of the gender and ethnicity gaps remain when controlling for various
measures of high school preparation. Controlling for observables, females are 24.2 percentage
points less likely to intend to major in physical sciences and 13.4 percentage points more likely to
major in life sciences. Asian students are 9.4 percentage points more likely to major in physical
sciences and 2.4 percentage points less likely to major in life sciences. The magnitudes of these
gaps is considerably smaller than the raw gaps, suggesting that high school preparation (or ability)
accounts for some, but not all, of the intended major choices of females and Asians.
For Hispanic and black students, however, the raw gap in the likelihood of declaring a physical
or life science major disappears after controlling for preparation/ability, suggesting that differences
in intended majors between black/Hispanic students and white students is entirely due to differ-
ential preparation between these groups. If anything, conditional on high school performance and
preparation, black and Hispanic students are more likely than white students to pursue physical or
life science majors.
Consistent with the notion that stronger students tend to enter physical sciences, a one standard
deviation increase in SAT score is associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of intending to major in the physical sciences and a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood
of intending to major in the life sciences. One’s percentile in high school, on the other hand, has
little effect on the propensity to major in physical science and increases the chance of intending to
major in life science by 3.2 percentage points.
As expected, entering college with calculus credit strongly influences the probability of intend-
ing a physical science major, improving the likelihood by 16.6 percentage points. This effect may
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be because students with calculus credit have a preference for math intensive fields or because stu-
dents with calculus credit have (or feel like they have) solid preparation to pursue math intensive
curricula. Controlling for whether a student has taken AP/IB calculus, the raw number of incoming
college credits a student has is associated with a small decrease in the likelihood of majoring in the
physical sciences. This makes intuitive sense because a student with only calculus credit is pulled
strongly towards math intensive fields whereas a student with calculus credit, English credit, and
biology credit may have more attractive options outside of the physical sciences. The impact of
incoming calculus credit and total credits is reversed for the life sciences; however, the magnitudes
of the effects are much smaller than for physical science.
Based on the determinants of entering each field, physical and life sciences are less similar
than are life and non-science. In cases where data limitations or sample sizes prevent separately
analyzing life, physical and non-scientists, the above regression provides some evidence that the
appropriate grouping may be physical science vs life and non-science instead of non-science vs
physical and life science.
2.3.2 Descriptive Analysis of Persistence
Conditional on intending to major in physical or life science, there is substantial variation in the
probability of graduating with a degree in life or physical sciences across groups. Because the vast
majority of students at LSRU eventually earn a degree, students who fail to persist in physical or
life sciences are generally switching to an alternative major. As with the initial decision to declare
a physical or life science major, the persistence patterns in the life and physical sciences are very
different.
2.3.2.1 Gender Gap
The most dramatic difference between life and physical science persistence patterns is that at
LSRU university, the gender gap in persistence is solely driven by a gender gap in the physical
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sciences. This fact is demonstrated emphatically by Figures 2.1 and 2.2.6 As can be seen in Figure
2.1, there is essentially no difference in the persistence rates of females vs males in the life sciences.
Not only do the two genders have similar graduation rates, but the trajectory with which the two
groups attrit is virtually identical. Conversely, the figure for physical science shows a substantial
gap between the persistence rates for males and females. Over 80% of males who intend to major in
physical science successfully due so, whereas only 70% of females who intend to major in physical
science persist. If one were to combine physical and life sciences in analysis, a persistence gap
would appear, both because a persistence gap exists in the physical sciences and because raw
persistence rates are much lower in the life sciences where females are overrepresented.
2.3.2.2 Race and Ethnicity
The persistence gaps between black students and non-black students are qualitatively similar for
life and physical sciences. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that black students are nearly 20 percentage
points less likely to persist in both the physical and life sciences. The difference in persistence
between Hispanic students and non-Hispanic students is smaller but qualitatively similar to the
black/non-black gap and is shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show persistence
rates broken out by whether a student is Asian or not. Asian students are considerably more
likely to persist in the physical sciences; however, their persistence pattern is similar to non-Asian
students for the life sciences.
2.3.2.3 SAT Scores
Students with higher SAT scores are more likely to persist in the sciences. This is true for both
physical and life science and the relationship between SAT scores and persistence is similar across
6I examine 4 year persistence rather than 6 year persistence in order to be able to include the 2002 and 2003 cohorts
in all analyses. The qualitative results are identical when using 6 year persistence rates.
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fields. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show persistence rates separately for three SAT categories at LSRU.
The “high SAT” category is the top quartile of SAT scores, the “low SAT” category is the bottom
quartile and the “mid SAT” category represents students with SAT scores in the interquartile range.
2.3.3 Empirical Methods: Determinants of Persistence
While the above descriptive analysis highlights the raw persistence gaps between various groups,
it fails to control for factors which may be correlated with group membership. As in equation 1, I
control for observable factors which proxy for high school preparation. Furthermore, I can control
for both observed and unobserved characteristics of students once they arrive. My aim in these
analyses is to investigate the role of preparation, peers and grades.
Since the vast majority of major changes are from life or physical science majors to non-science
fields, I focus on the probability of persisting in one’s field rather than attempting to separately
investigate transitions within and out of science majors. When a linear probability model is esti-
mated, a small fraction of students have predicted persistence rates of above 100% and thus I opt
to estimate a logit model instead. Specifically, I estimate
P (yij = 1) =
e β
￿X
1 + e β￿X
(2)
where β￿X = β1GPAsij + β2Peersij + β3Xi + γj
yij is an indicator for whether student i, taking course j, persists in her major field through
the fourth year. The vector GPAs includes each student’s overall GPA as well as separate GPAs
calculated for physical science courses and life science courses. The Peers vector includes a
measure of average peer quality for student i in course j.7 A detailed explanation of the peer
quality measure is given in Section 2.3.4.3. The vector Xi includes a variety of fixed student
characteristics, specifically SAT score, high school percentile, race, sex, incoming college credits
7Student i’s peer characteristics are calculated excluding student i.
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and an indicator for having calculus credit prior to entering college. Naturally, within individual i,
cross course correlations will not be zero, thus all standard errors are clustered at the student level.
This model is estimated separately for life and physical sciences. For regressions predicting
persistence in physical sciences, I include only core required physical science courses in the regres-
sion. Similarly, regressions that predict persistence in the life sciences only include core required
life science courses. Focusing on large core courses facilitates the inclusion of course fixed effects
and limits the analysis only to students who plausibly intend to major in their listed “intended
major.”8
Including course fixed effects has two major advantages. First, students in the same course
presumably have similar interests and thus the inclusion of course fixed effects controls for un-
observed differences between students who choose different courses. Second, because the same
courses are offered each year, I am able to identify the effect of peer characteristics using across
time variation, holding course topic fixed. Without course fixed effects, the impact of peers would
be confounded by the fact that one’s peers would be determined by one’s course choices (Sacer-
dote, 2001). Cohort fixed effects are included in some specifications in order to account for time
varying unobserved factors that affect an entire cohort’s persistence.
2.3.4 Results: Determinants of Persistence
2.3.4.1 Physical Science
Table 2.3 shows the coefficients when equation 2 is estimated for physical science majors. The
first column omits the course fixed effects and the last column introduces cohort fixed effects.
For ease of interpretation the average marginal effect is given. When controlling for performance
factors, females still are more likely to drop out of the physical sciences but the magnitude is much
smaller than that implied by the raw gap shown in Figure 2.2. The raw persistence gap is nearly 10
percentage points and this gap drops to just 2.7 percentage points when controlling for performance
8A small percentage of students list a science major as their intended major during admissions but take no science
courses during their first year. These students are omitted from the persistence analysis.
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and course fixed effects. The inclusion of course fixed effects may understate the persistence gap
if being a female causes course choices which lead to lower persistence. However, column (1) of
Table 2.3 shows that even when omitting the course fixed effect the gender gap in persistence is
just 2.8 percentage points.
The persistence gap between black and white students is statistically and substantively in-
significant once controlling for other factors. This is rather remarkable given that the raw gap in
persistence is 12.4 percentage points. This phenomenon is true for Hispanic students as well, as
the large raw gap is completely explained by other factors. Importantly, some of the other factors
for which I control, such as GPA, may themselves be a function of one’s gender or race and thus
the regression might be over controlling. Regardless, the results indicate that once other factors are
equalized, being black or Hispanic has no impact on persistence. Asian students are more likely to
persist, controlling for other factors. When controlling for course and cohort fixed effects, Asian
students are 3.7 percentage points more likely to persist than comparable white students.
High school preparation generally is a weak predictor of persistence once college grades are
controlled for. This does not mean that preparation is unimportant, rather that the entire benefit
to high school preparation is captured in performance in college courses. Taking calculus before
entering college is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in persistence probabilities.
However, the positive effect of calculus is only statistically significant when controlling for course
and cohort fixed effects and is not robust across specifications. Given that my preferred specifica-
tion is to include course and cohort fixed effects, I view this result as providing some suggestive
evidence that calculus preparation may be helpful for persistence.
Performance in college courses is a critical determinant of persistence. As shown in column
(3) of Table 2.3, a one point increase in a student’s average physical science grades is associated
with an 11.5 percentage point increase in the probability of persisting in the physical sciences.9
Controlling for a student’s grade performance in her science courses, improving overall GPA by
one point decreases persistence by 3.5 percentage points. There may be small negative effects to
9A one point increase is the equivalent of a one letter grade increase e.g. improving from a B to an A.
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performing well in life science courses, but this is not statistically significant. While the above
results may partially reflect students simply gravitating towards their relative strengths, I show in
section 2.4.1 that grading standard differentials across fields may lead to student attrition that is
unrelated to the revelation of relative ability.
Broadly, the inclusion of cohort and course fixed effects has little impact on the coefficients
in Table 2.3. The notable exception is that the first column of Table 2.3 suggests that having a
larger class is beneficial to completing the major. However columns 2-3 show that this effect is
completely absent when controlling for course fixed effects. The correlation between class size
and major persistence is unlikely to be causal since there is no evidence of this correlation within
a course.
A measure of peer quality is controlled for throughout Table 2.3 and I explore these results in
Section 2.3.4.3.
2.3.4.2 Life Science
Table 2.4 shows the coefficients when equation 2 is estimated for life science majors. Given
that no raw persistence gap exists between genders for the life sciences, it is no surprise that gender
is found to have no predictive power for persistence probabilities. Unlike in the physical sciences,
the raw persistence gaps for Hispanic students is not fully explained by other factors. Controlling
for factors such as performance and course choice, Hispanic students are still 8.2 percentage points
less likely than white students to persist in the life sciences. The raw gap in persistence between
Hispanic and white students in the life sciences is 20.7 percent so nearly half of this persistence
gap cannot be explained by academic performance. Although the raw persistence rate for Asian
students in the life sciences is only 5.85 percentage points worse than white students, this raw gap
cannot be explained by performance or preparation factors.
Just as in physical sciences, high school preparation generally is a weak predictor of persistence
once college grades are controlled for. Higher SAT scores are associated with slightly lower per-
sistence rates (1.9 percentage points per standard deviation) but calculus and other entering college
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credits are statistically and substantively insignificant. Given that college grades are controlled for
in this regression, it is not surprising that SAT score has a slightly negative effect. One potential
explanation is that students with high SAT scores but average first year college grades may lack
certain study or organizational skills that make persistence difficult in life science courses which
typically value these skills.10
The effect of own subject grades for life scientists is extremely similar to the effect for physical
scientists. A one point increase in a student’s GPA in her first year life science courses is associated
with a 10.7 percentage point increase in the probability of persisting. Similarly higher grades in
non-science courses are associated with lower persistence rates. A one point increase in a student’s
first year GPA holding science GPA constant is associated with an 8.1 percentage point decrease in
persistence. The effect of non-science GPA on persistence in the life sciences is more than twice
as large as for the physical sciences.
Somewhat surprisingly, receiving higher grades in one’s physical science courses is associated
with higher persistence in the life sciences. This effect partially reflects that students who perform
well in their physical science courses are more skilled and thus more capable to persist in any field
they choose. In addition, the pulling effect of high grades in the physical sciences is likely fairly
small given that it is very rare to transfer into the physical sciences.11 Furthermore, receiving higher
grades in certain physical science courses may directly promote life science persistence because
courses such as organic chemistry are technically physical science courses, but are required for
many life science majors.
As with the physical sciences, there is a correlation between class size and persistence, but this
disappears when controlling for course fixed effects. Students who take larger courses tend to have
lower persistence rates, but this should not be interpreted causally.
10Anecdotal evidence suggests that study and organizational skills may be more important in the life sciences
compared to physical sciences, because the former rewards factual knowledge (which requires studying) more than
the latter.
11Fully 95 percent of successful physical science majors entered college intending to major in the physical sciences.
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2.3.4.3 Peer Effects
In order to examine the effect of peers on an individual’s persistence, I include a measure of
peer persistence in the above regression. Were I to simply include the average persistence of one’s
classmates, I would overstate the importance of the peer effect because of the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993). Since student i may impact her peer’s persistence through her own persistence,
the persistence of her peers is not exogenous to her own persistence. Previous research avoids
conflating endogenous and exogenous peer effects by focusing on peer characteristics determined
prior to college enrollment such as SAT score (Sacerdote, 2001). I follow a similar tact, but rather
than examining a particular factor, I aggregate these factors to measure the propensity to persist.12
Specifically, I use the predicted values from a regression of persistence on pre-college char-
acteristics to generate a propensity score for each student. This propensity score is a linear com-
bination of pre-college characteristics and thus student i’s propensity score will be exogenous to
student j’s persistence probabilities. Using the propensity score for each student, I calculate aver-
age propensity scores by class. Since these averages vary by semester, they are still identified with
the inclusion of course and cohort fixed effects.
Although it seems unlikely that student i would influence student j’s propensity score, it is
possible that two propensity scores are jointly determined by the admissions committee. Assuming
that the admissions committee has more information regarding a student’s propensity to persist
than I have included in my regression, any broad goal to improve persistence in a cohort may
bias estimates upwards. Because of this plausible threat to identification, my preferred estimates
include cohort fixed effects to control for global admissions changes that directly affect both an
individual and the pre-college characteristics of her peers. In practice, omitting the cohort fixed
effects yields very similar results. When estimated without course fixed effects, the magnitude on
the peer coefficient increases dramatically, but this simply reflects that students sort into classrooms
and thus I do not consider it as evidence of peer effects.
12Carrell et al. (2009) uses a similar strategy and uses pre-college characteristics to generate predicted GPA’s for
one’s peers.
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Table 2.5 shows the results for peer effects. Row 1 shows that students are more likely to
persist when their peers are more likely to persist. A 10 percentage point increase in the propensity
of one’s peers to persist leads to a 2.08 percentage point increase in the probability of persistence.
This effect decreases very slightly when cohort fixed effects are included, suggesting that joint
determination of persistence within a cohort is not a major concern. The reduced form impact of
peer composition in first year courses may overstate the importance of peers in a single course.
Since a student is likely to have repeated interactions with first year peers, the effect I capture is
the cumulative effect of these interactions.
While the existence of peer effects is interesting in its own right, there are only clear policy
implications if non-linearities exist across who benefits from high quality peers. In a world with
homogenous peer effects, all redistributions or reorganizations will yield an equivalent amount of
spillover benefits. To investigate the possibility of non-linear peer effects, I re-estimate equation 2
on two subsamples determined by one’s own propensity score. Table 2.5 shows that students who
are at most risk of failing to persist are also most influenced by their peers. For the bottom quartile,
a 10 percentage point increase in the propensity scores of one’s peers leads to a 3.53 percentage
point increase in own persistence. The effect of peers on the upper quartile is much smaller and
not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the findings of Carrell et al. (2009) that
low achieving students benefit most from exposure to high achieving peers.
Consistent with Han and Li (2009), I find evidence that females are more influenced by their
peers than males. While both males and females benefit from exposure to higher quality peers,
the effect is more than twice as large for women as compared to men. A 10 percentage point
increase in the propensity scores of one’s peers increases the likelihood of a female persisting by
3.70 percentage points compared to only 1.37 percentage points for males.
Unlike the physical science analysis, I find little evidence that peer effects are important in
the life sciences. This may be because the substantially smaller sample size for the life sciences
prevents the detection of such effects or may simply reflect a lack of peer effects in the life sciences
for my sample. Anecdotal evidence and discussions with life and physical science professors
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suggest that physical science courses rely more heavily on group work and collaborative problem
sets, which may explain why peers appear to be more important in the physical sciences.
2.4 Discussion and Extensions
2.4.1 Grades
In both life and physical sciences, improvements in own subject GPA are associated with
greater persistence in that subject whereas improvements in non-science GPA are associated with
transferring away from the intended major. This intuitive finding could in fact reflect optimal sort-
ing if grades are indicative of relative strengths. In terms of maximizing each student’s potential, it
makes sense for a student who initially declares a physical science major to drop out if she discov-
ers that she is not well suited to it. In particular, if students enter college with incorrect information
regarding their relative strengths, grading provides a potentially effective mechanism for informing
a student which major field they should choose (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2009). Unfortu-
nately, this mechanism is only effective when grading standards are consistent across disciplines.
Table 2.6 shows that this is emphatically not the case. As is true nationally, grading standards are
dramatically different between majors at LSRU.
Furthermore, the difference in average grades is not simply a reflection of differential student
sorting into various majors. As shown in the third column of Table 2.6, students who intend to
major in physical sciences receive higher grades in their non-science courses compared to their
physical science courses. One might expect that physical science majors would perform best in
their physical science courses, but the opposite is true. As a result, a student who is best suited for
life or physical sciences may in fact choose a non-science major if she is attracted by her higher
average grades in these fields.
2.4.1.1 Differential Gender Responses to Grades
Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) provides evidence that females are more sensitive to grades in
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determining economics major persistence and proposes that a similar phenomenon may contribute
to the gender gap in the sciences. To investigate this possibility I re-estimate the above model
separately for females and males. For the physical sciences, where a gender gap exists, the corre-
lation between grades and persistence is very consistent with the hypothesis put out by Rask and
Tiefenthaler.
As shown in Table 2.7, in the physical sciences, females are more sensitive to grades both in
terms of major field performance and outside option performance. For females a one point increase
in GPA in physical science courses improves the probability of persistence by 13.4 percent whereas
the corresponding figure for males is only 10.7 percent. Similarly, a one point increase in overall
GPA (holding constant science GPA) leads to a much steeper decline in persistence for females
than for males. Interestingly, the same does not appear to be true for the life sciences. Own field
grades have a similar impact on both males and females and outside options have a larger impact
for males than they do for females.
While the reason for a grade response differential in the physical sciences but not the life sci-
ences is unclear, one possibility is that student grade response is a function of perceived “minority”
status as opposed to gender per se. There is insufficient evidence presented in this study to con-
clude anything about the causes of gender response differentials, but this study’s results as well as
the findings of Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) are consistent with the social psychology theories of
stereotype vulnerability or attributional ambiguity (Crocker and Major, 1989). Essentially, these
theories hold that individuals in a minority position have a tendency to be influenced by stereo-
types about one’s social category. In particular, Aronson and Inzlicht (2004) find that students who
exhibit signs of stereotype vulnerability are less able to gauge performance and consequently have
unstable academic self-concept and efficacy. Furthermore, the authors note that “unstable efficacy
is associated with increased sensitivity to performance feedback, both positive and negative” (p.
834). In other words, a female majoring in the physical sciences may have a particularly large
response to grades because she is in the minority whereas females majoring in the life sciences are
not a minority group.
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2.4.2 Peers
While recent influential research on peer effects finds no impact on major choices this may be
due to looking at the wrong peers (Foster, 2006; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006). Previous
research obtains convincing identification through the random assignment of roommates, but it is
far from clear that roommates are the peers who would be expected to impact major persistence.
While my identification strategy is not as perfectly clean, my study benefits in that it examines
peer effects in an important academic context. Naturally, the impact of one’s roommates may have
a different impact on major persistence than the impact of one’s classmates, particularly one’s
classmates in key major courses.
Because the benefit of persistent peers is non-linear, social gains are possible by sorting stu-
dents efficiently. Since students with a low propensity to persist benefit from exposure to high
propensity peers and high propensity students do not seem to be brought down by low propensity
peers, complete integration yields optimal results. While theoretically the implication of the non-
linear peer effect is clear, in practice the impact of resorting may yield unanticipated consequences
not captured in my analysis. The potential for these unanticipated consequences is highlighted
by Carrell, Sacerdote and West (Unpublished). Although Carrell et al. (2009) find evidence of
non-linear peer effects similar to those found in this paper, Carrell, Sacerdote and West (Unpub-
lished) documents that an attempt to exploit these non-linearities to improve the outcomes of low
achievers actually negatively impacted these students.
The finding that females are more susceptible to peer influence than males is consistent with
a large body of literature in social psychology (Eagly, 1978) in addition to the recent randomized
peer effects study Han and Li (2009). Once again, it is theoretically possible to exploit this non-
linearity to improve total social welfare, but the exact implications of actually implementing such
a policy are beyond the scope of this analysis.
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2.5 Conclusion
This study describes persistence in the life and physical sciences at a large selective research
university. Examining the role of preparation, grades and peers, I find a large impact of grades on
persistence in both fields. While preparation is strongly correlated with persistence, there is little
evidence that preparation directly impacts persistence outside of its impact on college grades.
As expected, students who receive higher grades in non-science courses are more likely to
transfer out of the sciences and students who receive higher own field grades are less likely to
transfer out of the sciences. This mechanism is very similar for life and physical science majors,
except that life science majors who perform well in physical science courses are actually more
likely to persist in the life sciences. This may reflect the fact that very few students transfer between
life and physical science majors and the threat to major persistence is transferring to non-science
majors.
The primary descriptive finding is that males and females persist equally well in the life sci-
ences but a large gap exists in the physical sciences. This gap narrows considerably when control-
ling for other factors, but even controlled estimates show that females have slightly worse persis-
tence rates in the physical sciences. The raw persistence gap for black students compared to white
students is present in both the life and the physical sciences, but can largely be explained by per-
formance and preparation factors. Conversely, even when controlling for other factors, Hispanic
students are found to have much lower persistence rates in the life sciences than white students.
This study also documents evidence of peer effects in the physical sciences but finds no evi-
dence of similar effects in the life sciences. For the physical sciences, exposure to peers who have
a higher ex-ante probability of persistence is found to increase the probability of persistence. The
impact of peers is shown to have important non-linearities where females and unlikely persisters
experience the greatest gains from exposure to high quality peers.
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Figure 2.1: Persistence rates for Life Sciences by Gender
Figure 2.2: Persistence rates for Physical Sciences by Gender
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Figure 2.3: Persistence rates for Life Sciences by Race
Figure 2.4: Persistence rates for Physical Sciences by Race
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Figure 2.5: Persistence rates for Life Sciences by Race
Figure 2.6: Persistence rates for Physical Sciences by Race
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Figure 2.7: Persistence rates for Life Sciences by Race
Figure 2.8: Persistence rates for Physical Sciences by Race
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Figure 2.9: Persistence rates for Life Sciences by SAT
Figure 2.10: Persistence rates for Physical Sciences by SAT
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Intended Major
Mean Not Science Physical Science Life Science None declared
Female 0.487 0.570 0.287 0.613 0.597
Black 0.046 0.058 0.023 0.053 0.066
White 0.537 0.574 0.494 0.552 0.518
Asian 0.161 0.117 0.221 0.150 0.140
Hispanic 0.054 0.058 0.039 0.061 0.073
Multiple races reported 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.029
Native American 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
Race not reported 0.172 0.164 0.194 0.155 0.164
Number of incoming college courses 1.104 0.818 1.410 1.175 0.922
Incoming credit for calculus 0.237 0.153 0.341 0.229 0.196
Percentile (higher number is better rank) 0.938 0.922 0.949 0.949 0.926
SAT or equivalent 1358.242 1328.776 1398.941 1347.410 1349.001
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Table 2.2: Intended Major
Intended Major Field
Physical Science Life Science Non-Science
Female -0.242*** 0.134*** 0.118***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Black 0.009 0.020 -0.060**
(0.024) (0.017) (0.022)
Hispanic 0.026 0.013 -0.074***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.019)
Asian 0.094*** -0.024* -0.108***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Standardized SAT score 0.083*** -0.028*** -0.116***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Standardized class percentile rank -0.002 0.032*** -0.094***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Incoming calculus credit 0.166*** -0.058*** -0.156***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Number of incoming college courses -0.027*** 0.017*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors
clustered at class level reported in parentheses.
Notes: Marginal effects from a multinomial logit are given in the table. The coeffi-
cients from all three columns come from a single regression on 15,508 observations.
The variables “SAT score” and “class percentile rank” have been standardized to
facilitate coefficient interpretation. For the variable “class percentile rank”, lower
numbers indicate a better ranking.
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Table 2.3: Persistence in Physical Science
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(std. error) Marginal (std. error) Marginal (std. error) Marginal
Female -0.284*** -0.028 -0.275*** -0.027 -0.274*** -0.027
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Black -0.098 -0.010 -0.117 -0.011 -0.114 -0.011
(0.274) (0.274) (0.277)
Asian 0.416*** 0.038 0.414*** 0.037 0.404*** 0.037
(0.124) (0.125) (0.125)
Hispanic -0.172 -0.017 -0.165 -0.016 -0.168 -0.017
(0.243) (0.242) (0.242)
# of incoming college courses -0.015 -0.001 -0.020 -0.002 -0.005 -0.000
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
Incoming calculus credit 0.172 0.016 0.199 0.019 0.298* 0.028
(0.169) (0.169) (0.180)
High school percentile 1.927 0.185 1.929 0.184 1.848 0.176
(1.192) (1.202) (1.221)
Standardized SAT score -0.056 -0.005 -0.061 -0.006 -0.075 -0.007
(0.066) (0.067) (0.068)
GPA in 1st year life sci. courses -0.219 -0.021 -0.220 -0.021 -0.218 -0.021
(0.166) (0.168) (0.169)
GPA in 1st year phys sci. courses 1.211*** 0.117 1.201*** 0.114 1.209*** 0.115
(0.149) (0.149) (0.153)
GPA in 1st year courses -0.359* -0.035 -0.354* -0.034 -0.368* -0.035
(0.203) (0.202) (0.205)
Class size in core phys. sci. course 0.249*** 0.024 0.074 0.007 0.102 0.010
(0.035) (0.075) (0.073)
Course fixed effect No Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effect No No Yes
Observations 19467 19467 19467
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at the student level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is major persistence to the fourth year in the physical sciences. The regression is
restricted to students who intend to major in the physical sciences. Also included in the regression are missing
indicators for cases where GPA or high school percentile is missing and peer characteristics.
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Table 2.4: Persistence in Life Science
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(std. error) Marginal (std. error) Marginal (std. error) Marginal
Female 0.021 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.000
-0.102 (0.102) (0.103)
Black -0.243 -0.046 -0.191 -0.035 -0.224 -0.041
-0.218 (0.217) (0.216)
Asian -0.346** -0.065 -0.326** -0.061 -0.342** -0.063
-0.147 (0.147) (0.148)
Hispanic -0.425** -0.082 -0.417** -0.079 -0.441** -0.083
-0.204 (0.203) (0.203)
# of incoming college courses -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.018 0.003
-0.036 (0.037) (0.039)
Incoming calculus credit -0.255 -0.048 -0.225 -0.041 -0.170 -0.031
-0.161 (0.163) (0.165)
High school percentile -1.121 -0.204 -1.071 -0.193 -0.983 -0.175
-0.983 (0.981) (1.001)
Standardized SAT score -0.084 -0.015 -0.097* -0.017 -0.108* -0.019
-0.058 (0.058) (0.059)
GPA in 1st year life sci. courses 0.621*** 0.113 0.596*** 0.107 0.599*** 0.107
-0.098 (0.098) (0.098)
GPA in 1st year phys. sci courses 0.324*** 0.059 0.343*** 0.062 0.359*** 0.064
-0.1 (0.100) (0.101)
GPA in 1st year courses -0.442** -0.080 -0.421** -0.076 -0.456** -0.081
-0.178 (0.177) (0.179)
Class size in core life sci. course -0.179*** -0.033 -0.160 -0.029 -0.151 -0.027
-0.041 (0.165) (0.168)
Course fixed effect No Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effect No No Yes
Observations 6736 6736 6736
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at the student level
reported in parentheses.
Notes: The dependent variable is major persistence to the fourth year in the life sciences. The regression is
restricted to students who intend to major in the life sciences. Also included in the regression are missing
indicators for cases where GPA or high school percentile is missing and peer characteristics.
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Table 2.5: Impact of Average Peer Propensity Score
Panel A: Physical Sciences
Course &
Course FE Marginal Cohort FE Marginal
All students 2.181*** 0.208 2.160*** 0.205
(0.582) (0.560)
Bottom 25th percentile of propensity scores 2.889*** 0.360 2.834*** 0.353
(0.986) (0.954)
Top 25th percentile of propensity scores 0.469 0.038 0.599 0.048
(1.367) (1.291)
Females 2.968*** 0.347 3.176*** 0.370
(0.975) (0.927)
Males 1.709** 0.146 1.600** 0.137
(0.752) (0.741)
Panel B: Life Sciences
Course &
Course FE Marginal Cohort FE Marginal
All students -0.279 -0.050 0.396 0.071
(0.767) (0.782)
Bottom 25th percentile of propensity scores 1.582 0.268 1.642 0.271
(1.939) (1.974)
Top 25th percentile of propensity scores 0.264 0.043 2.273 0.361
(1.514) (1.593)
Females -0.201 -0.035 0.433 0.075
(0.901) (0.933)
Males -0.621 -0.114 0.272 0.050
(1.525) (1.559)
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Table 2.6: Grading Standards by Course Type and Student Intended Major
Intended Major
All Students Not Science Physical Science Life Science
Non-Science Course 3.33 3.31 3.35 3.39
Physical Science Course 3.13 3.08 3.16 3.06
Life Science Course 3.21 3.07 3.17 3.27
Table 2.7: Impact of Grades on Persistence for Males and Females
Panel A: Physical Sciences
Females Marginal Males Marginal
GPA in 1st year life sci. courses 0.034 0.004 -0.416* -0.036
(0.253) (0.239)
GPA in 1st year phys. sci. courses 1.150*** 0.134 1.256*** 0.107
(0.250) (0.197)
GPA in 1st year courses -0.608* -0.071 -0.293 -0.025
(0.352) (0.257)
Panel B: Life Sciences
Females Marginal Males Marginal
GPA in 1st year life sci. courses 0.617*** 0.107 0.542*** 0.099
(0.124) (0.167)
GPA in 1st year phys. sci. courses 0.292** 0.050 0.521*** 0.095
(0.126) (0.167)
GPA in 1st year courses -0.399* -0.069 -0.547* -0.100
(0.225) (0.286)
77
Chapter 3: The Impact of Letter Grades on Student Course Se-
lection andMajor Choice: Evidence from aRegression-Discontinuity
Design
3.1 Introduction
The extent to which students respond to their letter grades is crucial to understanding student
major choice and course taking behavior. These decisions are of particular concern to policy mak-
ers given the considerable effort that has been devoted to improving major persistence, especially
in the sciences. A common concern, first explicated in Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991), is that
differential grading standards across the disciplines distort course taking behavior. In particular,
students may decide to avoid a science major given the generally lower grades given in the sci-
ences. Given that leniently graded fields are not necessarily more societally valuable than harsher
grading fields, the distortion caused by student grade concerns has the potential to damage societal
welfare.
Many studies have investigated whether students strongly respond to their letter grades. All
such studies of which I am aware have found that students strongly respond to their letter grades
such that students with higher letter grades in introductory courses are much more likely to major
in that subject. The response of students to their letter grades is generally argued as efficient in that
it promotes students sorting towards their comparative advantage; however, grading imbalances
across fields distort this sorting process. Simulations from this literature suggest that equating let-
ter grades across the university would have the (beneficial) impact of encouraging more students to
pursue science. While research on this topic has spanned many years, institutions and disciplines,
a fundamental obstacle to identifying the impact of letter grades on major choice is the possibil-
ity of unobserved factors which influence both major probabilities and introductory course letter
grades. In particular, if students with more interest in a subject work harder, one would expect
to see students with the highest performance also being the most likely to major. Though several
studies have controlled for overall performance to identify a student’s comparative advantage, this
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approach does not address concerns that students put relatively more effort into the introductory
courses in the field in which they plan to major.
Our study overcomes this obstacle by implementing a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design
to identify the causal impact of letter grades on major choice and course performance. We supple-
ment administrative records with a refined measure of course performance, collected directly from
course instructors. This data allows us to observe not only the letter grade a student receives, but
the exact numerical score they earned in the course. By comparing the major and course choices
made by students with similar numerical scores, but different letter grades, I aim to identify the
causal impact of the letter grades. To implement this analysis I collect original numerical scores for
65 introductory courses across 6 fields at a large selective research institution (LSRU). I combine
these data with each student’s full transcript, demographic information and major choices.
To examine this issue, I take two distinct approaches. In my first approach, I reproduce the
typical analysis of the literature, as if I did not know exact numerical scores. I find evidence of a
clear relationship between letter grades and major choices, which matches that found in the rest of
the literature. When I add my collected numerical scores to this regression, however, I find that
the entire correlation is explained by a linear function of numerical score. Once controlling for
numerical score, none of the letter grades indicators are statistically significant and I am unable to
reject the hypothesis that letter grades do not contribute to the model. In my second approach, I use
the exact numerical score to implement an RD design testing whether students are more likely to
major and take more course work in fields in which they earn higher grades. I find no evidence that
students respond to their letter grades based on the RD specification and my estimates are fairly
precise. Since cutoffs exist throughout the entire distribution, I am able to estimate a variety of
local treatment effects and find no evidence that students respond to their letter grades whether at
the top or bottom of the overall distribution. While I am unable to examine students who are not
on a grade margin, the students who are of most interest to policy makers are precisely the students
who are marginal and thus the RD research design is well suited to this application.
As in any RD design, my major concern is the possibility that students manipulate their scores
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in order to fall just above a cutoff. This sort of manipulation is implausible on the final exam itself
since students are unlikely to be able to precisely manipulate their test performance. However, it is
very possible that extremely motivated students might effectively argue with their professor in an
effort to boost their final letter grade, even when their exact numerical score does not qualify them
for the higher grade. The key assumption made for the RD design is that the numeric scores are
not manipulated to fall just above or below a cutoff—manipulation of letter grades will not bias
estimates. To the extent that students are granted higher letter grades than their numerical score
dictates, this simply converts the strict RD design to a fuzzy RD design. Importantly, even if the
students who argue for higher grades are unobservably different than students who do not argue,
the fuzzy RD design will yield consistent estimates. In order to ensure that the underlying course
scores are not manipulated, I obtain the original spreadsheets used by professors in calculating
numerical scores and confirm with the professors that these spreadsheets were not altered, even
when a student successfully petitioned for a higher letter grade. I show that students frequently
are granted higher letter grades than their numerical score dictates. However, I find no evidence of
manipulation of the numerical scores themselves: the histograms of numeric scores around each
letter grade cutoff show no evidence of scores humping just above grade cutoffs.
The plan of the text is as follows. I begin by reviewing the literature in Section 3.2 paying
particular attention to the magnitudes found in previous research. Section 3.3 describes my data,
Section 3.4 presents my first regression approach and Section 3.5 presents my RD approach. I
provide a discussion of implications and how my work relates to previous research in Section 3.6
and conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
A large literature has examined the determinants of major choice with particular emphasis on
examining persistence in the sciences. Given the breadth of topics covered in this literature, I focus
here on describing the literature that examines the role of grades in determining major and course
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choices. Using data from Williams College, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) estimate how stu-
dents respond to letter grades and examine how differential grade inflation across disciplines might
distort major choice decisions. The authors find that controlling for performance in other subjects,
receiving an A instead of a B in an introductory course increases the likelihood of taking a sec-
ond course by approximately 10-20 percent for economics and English. Using a simulation, Sabot
and Wakeman-Linn show that if economics graded as leniently as English at Williams College,
enrollment in higher level economics courses would rise by 11.9 percent.
This basic point has been made repeatedly since that time and has been shown in a wide vari-
ety of disciplines and institutions. Christopher et al. (1994) examines the determinants of majoring
and persisting in natural science and engineering at four highly selective institutions and simi-
larly finds that letter grades are strongly correlated with declaring and remaining in these science
majors. Similarly, Ost (2010) finds that students with a one point higher physical science GPA
are 11 percentage points more likely to major in physical sciences and students with a one point
higher life science GPA are 11 percentage points more likely to major in life science. Using data
from a liberal arts college, Rask (2010) also finds that letter grades are important in predicting
persistence in STEM fields such that a one letter grade change increases the probability of persist-
ing by approximately five percentage points. Given that STEM departments grade more strictly
than most departments in his study, Rask simulates the effect of equating grading standards across
departments and concludes that this would increase STEM persistence by 2-4 percent.
In addition to discouraging persistence in STEM fields, student response to letter grades may
explain racial or gender imbalances in certain majors. Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) finds that
economics students are sensitive to their grades in introductory courses and in particular, women
appear more sensitive to these grades than men. Rask and Tiefenthaler posit that this sensitivity
differential explains part of the gender imbalance in economics in higher level courses since women
with equal performance to men leave economics at a higher rate. Owen (2010) confirms this finding
for economics and finds that changing from a B to an A increases the probability of majoring by
15 to 20 percentage points among women while having no statistically significant impact for men.
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While the literature examining the impact of introductory grades on course and major choice is
well developed, the majority of the above studies rely on regression frameworks for identification.
Several underlying behaviors are consistent with a strong correlation between letter grades and
major choices and the regression framework is unable to distinguish between these underlying
behaviors. First, it is possible that low letter grades in an introductory course cause students to
leave a subject – either because they care about maintaining a high GPA or because they learn that
their comparative advantage lies elsewhere. These two potential behavioral stories are intuitive
and have been the primary interpretation of the literature. However, the relationship between
major choice and introductory grades could also plausibly be generated by student response to
underlying factors. In particular, students may choose to work hardest in the subject in which they
intend to major, and as a result, they may earn their highest letter grades in their major fields. The
policy implication of this phenomenon is very different. If students respond to their letter grades
then equating average letter grades across departments has the potential to increase enrollments
in initially low grading departments. If, on the other hand, students simply work hardest in their
intended major, equating grading standards across departments will not have any direct impact on
enrollment or major choice behavior.
The only study of which I am aware that is able to rule out an underlying factor and plausibly
identify a causal impact of grades is Owen (2010). In her paper, Owen examines the impact of
letter grades on major choice in economics using a similar RD methodology to the one used in my
paper. She finds evidence of a strong impact of letter grades on major choices among women in
economics and given her identification strategy these are interpreted causally. Given that Owen
(2010) is the only paper that has estimated the causal impact of letter grades on major choices, I
consider the replication of her analysis to be a contribution. This is particularly true because like
many studies in this field, Owen (2010) focuses on a single institution and discipline and thus the
results may not generalize to other settings.1
We extend Owen (2010) by considering a different institution and 6 disciplines. Also, in an
1Owen performs secondary analyses using a small liberal arts school, but the small sample at the second school
prevents her from using a regression discontinuity design.
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attempt to improve the precision of the estimates, I have collected more than ten times the number
of observations as was used in the Owen. As a result, instead of using 30-60 observations on
either side of the threshold, I am able to use nearly 1,000 students on either side of the threshold.
The large amount of data facilitates breaking out the data more finely than previously possible
and exploring interactions between grade responsiveness and factors such as financial aid status,
gender, discipline and overall GPA. In the appendix, I attempt to replicate the exact analysis in
Owen (2010). We are unable to replicate her findings, despite studying a similar institution and
restricting my sample to just female economics students. Our large sample provides sufficient
precision such that I am able to rule out the effect sizes found by Owen for my sample. We discuss
potential reasons for this difference in results in the discussion section, but I am unable to provide
a definitive explanation.
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from three distinct sources that are merged together. First,
I collected grading spreadsheets from instructors at LSRU who teach large introductory courses.
In collecting these data, when possible, I obtained the original spreadsheets that professors had
used to record grades throughout the semester. In total I collected data from 65 course offerings
across 6 disciplines. Due to confidentiality agreements made with specific instructors, I am un-
able to disclose the exact disciplines for certain subjects, and thus categorize courses as “Physical
Science”, “Life Science” or “Economics”.2 Two key pieces of information come from the grad-
ing spreadsheets. First, the spreadsheets include each student’s final numerical score in a given
course. Second, I carefully went through each spreadsheet and coded instances in which the pro-
fessor indicated that he/she had altered a students numerical grade. The first key variable that
records numerical scores is of central importance to my entire analysis while the second is useful
2Data was also collected for another social science discipline, but this is excluded from the main analyses because
less than 1 percent of enrolled students intend to major in this subject. In practice, all results presented are robust to
the inclusion of this subject, but estimates become less precise.
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in assessing the extent to which grade manipulation might impact my results. Importantly, the
data collected from instructors does not represent the universe of students at LSRU because it is
restricted to only students who enrolled in one of the 65 course-offerings. In total, the spread-
sheet data includes 20,774 students-course observations representing 9,565 students over a 11 year
period (2000-2010).
Second, the registrar at LSRU provided the entire transcript for each student in the study popu-
lation for the entire duration of their enrollment at LSRU. This data includes unique course identi-
fiers and letter grades received for every course completed in addition to information on a students
declared major(s).3 From the transcript, I calculate cumulative GPA, semester GPA and categorize
course taking behavior. Using a unique student identifier, this data is merged to admissions data
from LSRU. The admissions data include basic demographic variables, financial aid information
and SAT/ACT scores for each student. In addition, the admissions data include information on
students’ intended majors, which they list on their application for admission. The match rate be-
tween the three sources of data is very high for the years 2005-2010, but because LSRU changed
administrative systems during the timeframe, I am unable to match all admissions variables prior
to 2005. The 2000-2010 data has 20,334 student-course observations matched to transcripts and
where possible, I use all of these observations. For some analyses, noted in the text, this sam-
ple is reduced as a result of missing admissions data in early years. The sample that focuses on
2005-2010 timeframe includes slightly over 13,000 observations.
The final merged dataset thus includes a complete course history for each student and two
related measures of performance for the collected introductory courses. The first measure of per-
formance is the exact numerical score the student received in the course (for example a 91/100).
The second measure of performance is the letter grade from the student transcript, ranging from an
F to an A+. These letter grades are converted to the LSRU GPA scale ranging from 0 to 4.3 where
a B+ is a 3.3 rather than a 3.3¯ and an A- is a 3.7 rather than as 3.6¯. Throughout the remainder of
3If a student enrolls in a class but drops the course within the first several weeks, this course will not appear on the
transcript or in my data. If a student drops the course after the designated drop period, I observe that student-course
combination in my data.
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the paper, I refer to these performance measures as numerical score and letter grade respectively.
Because different courses use different scales, the numeric scores are standardized to a 0 to 4.3
scale which is analogous to the 0 to 4.3 GPA scale but is measured continuously. This standard-
ization makes across-course comparisons possible and also facilitates comparisons to the previous
literature. In practice, this standardization is performed by mapping course grading cutoffs to the
GPA scale and then mapping each student’s score according to the distance from the cutoff. More
exactly, I use the following formula, where γ1 and γ2 are the grade cutoffs in the original distri-
bution, y is the student’s percentage score in the course and α1 and α2 are the grade cutoffs being
mapped to on the 0 to 4.3 scale.
Standardized Score = (y − γ1)α2 − α1
γ2 − γ1 + (γ2 − γ1) (1)
For example, if a course initially grades on a 100 point scale where 97 or above is an A+ and
93 or above is an A, I map 97 to a 4.3 and map 93 to a 4.0. A student who received a 95 would
be mapped to a 4.15 and a student who received a 96.4 would be mapped to a 4.255. While the
GPA scale ranges from 0 to 4.3, the continuos version allows for some grades to exceed 4.3 since
anyone who earns a numerical score above the A+ cutoff will be mapped to above a 4.3.
The first three columns of Table 3.2 show descriptive statistics for my data split by course
discipline. Of the 2,072 students I observe taking introductory economics, 43 percent are female,
2 percent are black and 7 percent are hispanic. These demographic characteristics are fairly similar
in engineering and the physical sciences but are dramatically different in the life sciences, where
the gender imbalance is reversed and there is higher representation of black students. SAT scores
(or ACT equivalents) are highest among students taking engineering and physical science courses
and lowest among students taking life science courses; however, this pattern is not reflected in
cumulative college GPA.
The most substantive difference between the three course categories is the intentions of students
taking these courses. Nearly 70 percent of students taking engineering or physical science intro-
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ductory courses intend to major in the course discipline. This is in stark contrast to the less than 5
percent of students taking economics who intend to major. The primary cause of this difference is
the fact that students majoring in engineering are required to apply to the engineering school and
list engineering as their intended major whereas there is no such requirement for economics ma-
jors (who enroll in the liberal arts portion of LSRU). Another potential reason for this difference is
that introductory economics requires less technical background than do introductory engineering
courses and thus students may be more likely to enroll in introductory economics purely out of
topical interest. Of students who enroll in economics 17.3 percent choose to major in economics.
The analogous figure is 60 percent for engineering and 53 percent for life sciences. This does not
imply that engineers and life science courses have higher major persistence but simply reflect the
fact that economics is a popular course among all students.
The last three columns of Table 3.2 restrict the attention to only students who eventually major
in the course subject. These students are fairly similar to the other students in their classes with the
notable exception that students who eventually major perform better in their introductory courses
than students who do not major. Importantly, the demographic characteristics are similar between
the students taking introductory courses and those majoring in the subject, suggesting that for this
recent timeframe, persistence rates are similar for males and females. Compared to the average
student taking an introductory course, a larger fraction of students who eventually major intended
to major in that subject.
3.3.1 Data Issue: Imputing Grading Cutoffs
While my data is improved over previous research, one important limitation is that I do not
exactly know the grading cutoffs used for the majority of the studied courses. Since knowing the
grading cutoffs is crucial to my entire analysis, I put in considerable efforts to ensure that grading
cutoffs are imputed accurately. Unlike many imputation procedures, it is not simply adequate to
obtain an unbiased estimate of the cutoffs – I require that my imputation procedure perfectly and
exactly obtains grading cutoffs. We are fairly confident that the imputation procedure that I use
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meets this high standard. The imputation procedure involves a quantitative imputation followed
by manually inspecting each course to ensure that the imputation is not driven by students with
manipulated letter grades. The quantitative procedure chooses the cutoff for grade X according
to the highest numerical grade received by an individual with a letter grade below X. In order to
explain the complete imputation procedure it is useful to consider an example. Table 3.1 shows 10
scores from students around the B+/A- cutoff in a hypothetical course. Because each course used
has hundreds of students, the density around any given cutoff is quite high and the example below
is representative of the typical course in terms of density.
Table 3.1: Hypothetical Course
Student ID Numeric Grade Letter Grade
1 89.544 B+
2 89.662 B+
3 89.781 A-
4 89.824 B+
5 89.932 B+
6 90.031 A-
7 90.125 A-
8 90.132 A-
9 90.209 A-
10 90.311 A-
In the above example, the algorithm identifies student 5 as having the highest numerical grade
of any student with below an A- letter grade. The imputed cutoff is then calculated as the average
of that student with the next highest students score. In this case, averaging student 5, and student
6 yields and estimated cutoff of 89.9815. This imputation procedure is relatively simple, but
performs exceptionally well. For the sample of courses for which I know the exact cutoffs, the
imputation is typically within 0.02 points of the correct cutoff and always within 0.1 points of
the correct cutoff. Once the grade cutoffs are imputed following the above procedure, I manually
inspected each course to make sure that cutoffs appear appropriate and are not driven by students
whose numeric grades were manipulated.
Note that in this example, student 3 received an A- but falls below imputed cutoff point. This
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situation is common in my data and I attribute this phenomenon to either persistent students who
argue for higher grades or generous professors who take into account motivation or performance
trends in assigning letter grades. Importantly, I observe the original distribution of numerical
scores, prior to the manipulation that results in student 3 receiving an A- and thus, this type of
grade manipulation will not bias my estimates.
3.4 Regression Model
Before examining the evidence from the Regression Discontinuity model, I first consider how
models used in the literature are altered when I include a control for numerical score. While
a variety of models have been used to estimate the impact of grades on major choice, the key
features of every model examines how course letter grades relate to major choice, conditional on
general academic performance in other courses (Ost, 2010; Owen, 2010; Rask, 2010; Rask and
Tiefenthaler, 2008; Sabot and Wakeman-Linn, 1991). We follow the literature in my approach and
estimate the following model as a baseline.
Yit = Xiβ + Zitα+
A+￿
j=D−
δjJit + γj + ￿it (2)
Yit is one of two measures of major choice. The first measure is an indicator for whether the
student eventually majors in the relevant subject while the second measure is a count of the total
number of credit hours taken in the relevant subject over the following three semesters.4 Xi is
a vector of time invariant characteristics including demographics, SAT score or ACT equivalent,
and an indicator for whether the student listed the field as his/her intended major on the LSRU
application. The vector Zit includes cumulative GPA in time t, GPA in time t, and credit hours
taken in time t. γj is a course fixed effect intended to capture important determinants of major
4Looking at course behavior over the following three semesters is motivated by a desire to smooth idiosyncratic
course taking behavior driven by the availability of certain courses in only the spring or fall; however, all results
presented in the paper are similar when looking at course taking behavior only in the semester immediately following
the introductory course.
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choice such as professor or peer quality (Carrell et al., 2010; Ost, 2010).
The key variables of interest are the coefficients on the dummy variables denoted by δj . Equa-
tion 2 is estimated as a linear probability model, but using a probit to predict major choice or a
count model to predict subject credit hours yields similar results.
Equation 2 is the model typically estimated in the literature and the results for my sample are
given in columns (1) of Table 3.3. Just as in the most papers in the literature, the results presented
in the first and fourth columns of Table 3.3 paint a clear picture of the relationship between letter
grades and major choice. Controlling for performance in other classes, students with better letter
grades are more likely to major in the field and the magnitude of this difference is large. A student
who receives an A- in an introductory course is 5 percentage points more likely to major in the
subject than a student who receives a B+. Moving from an A- to a B- lowers the probability of
majoring by nearly 9 percentage points and moving from an A- to a C- lowers the probability
of majoring by over 17 percentage points. While these effect sizes are very large, they are very
consistent with the rest of the literature that finds that, controlling for overall GPA, an increase of
one point on a four point scale in one’s introductory class is associated with a 15-20 percentage
point change in the probability of majoring in the subject.
Column (4) of Table 3.3 shows the results from the same model when predicting the number
of credit hours taken in the field in the following three semesters. This variable is intended to
capture more nuanced variation in subject interest, but naturally, credit hours taken is correlated
with eventual major choice. The results for credit hours are less consistent than for major choice
and better letter grades are not monotonically associated with more credit hours. Lower letter
grades in introductory courses are still generally associated with taking fewer subsequent credit
hours and the impact is statistically significant when considering large letter grade changes. For
example, students who receive a B- take 1.285 more credit hours than students who receive a C-.
While the relationship between letter grades and major choice is strong, whether this should be
interpreted causally is unclear. It is possible that higher letter grades cause students to major in a
subject, or it is plausible that students with the most interest or talent for a subject will both perform
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well in their introductory course and subsequently choose to major. To distinguish between these
two explanations, I add numerical score as an additional control that is intended to proxy for a
student’s natural talent or interest in a subject. Specifically, I estimate
Yit = Xiβ + Zitα+
A+￿
j=D−
δjJit + γj + ωSit + ￿it (3)
where Sit is a students numerical score for class t and all other variables are defined as in equation
2. If students actually respond to the letter grades that they receive, then one would expect the
dummy variables to remain significant after the inclusion of the numerical score. Column (2) of
Table 3.3 shows that the inclusion of the numerical score eliminates the correlation between letter
grades and major choices. The relationship between letter grades and major choice is no longer
monotonic, the coefficients are reduced by an order of magnitude and there are no statistically
significant differences between a B+ and other letter grades.
An alternative test of the importance of letter grades is given by the incremental F-test com-
paring a model with numeric score and letter grade dummies to a model with just numeric score .
Specifically, I first estimate
Yit = Xiβ + Zitα+ γj + ωSit + ￿it (4)
where all variables are defined as in equation 3. We use the incremental F-test to examine whether
the model given by equation 3 that includes the letter grade dummies contributes any explanatory
power compared to the model given by equation 4 that excludes the letter grade dummies. This
test is shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.3 and shows that adding letter grade dummies does
not improve the model, when numeric score is already controlled for. Similarly, when using future
credit hours as the outcome, the incremental F-test shows that adding letter grade dummies does
not improve the model, when numeric score is already included.
In summary, I am able to replicate the findings of literature using a similar model, but these
findings are not robust to the inclusion of the numerical score variable that I collected.
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3.4.1 Analysis of Females
Several previous papers have noted that females may be more sensitive to grade feedback than
males (Crocker and Major, 1989; Owen, 2010; Rask and Tiefenthaler, 2008; Seymour, 1995). In
order to investigate this possibility I re-estimate equations 2 through 4 on only the females in
my sample. Table 3.4 shows that results are fairly similar when focusing only on women. The
relationship between letter grades and major persistence remains strong, though it is no longer
entirely monotonic. Column 2 shows that once I control for numerical score, the relationship
between letter grades and major choices is dramatically reduced in magnitude and is no longer
statistically significant. As with the entire sample, female students with lower letter grades tend
to take fewer credit hours in a subject that they perform poorly in; however, this relationship is
not robust to the inclusion of the numeric score control. Once controlling for numeric score the
dummy variable for earning an “A” is negative and marginally significant and the F-test rejects
the hypothesis that the letter-grade dummy variables do not improve the model at the 10% level.
However, the overall relationship is highly non-monotonic and does not show broad evidence in
support of the notion that earning a higher letter grade increases the number of credit hours taken
in the field. That being said, given that the initial relationship between future credit hours and
grades is relatively weak among women, I find these results to be inconclusive regarding whether
letter grades matter in determining course choice among women.
3.5 Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Design
Based on the regression analysis, I conclude that the relationship between letter grades and
major choice is likely driven by an underlying continuous process. To test this further, I use a
regression discontinuity (RD) design to test for a structural break around each grade cutoff.
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3.5.1 Humping and Sorting
Given that RD estimates rely on comparability between students on either side of the threshold,
a threat to identification occurs if students sort around the cutoff in a systematic and unobserved
fashion. In the case of sorting around a grade cutoff, one might be especially concerned, because
grade cutoffs are sometimes known ahead of time and students have a strong incentive to put in
just enough effort for their numerical score to fall above a cutoff, or a student might argue with
his or her professor to receive a higher grade even when the numerical score falls just below the
cutoff (?). Furthermore, even if students are unable to successfully petition for higher grades, it is
plausible that professors will artificially raise certain students’ numerical score based on student
interest and motivation, student improvement during the semester or extenuating circumstances.
Whether driven by students or professors, this type of grade manipulation will likely generate a
very specific humping pattern in the histogram or numerical scores – a pattern that can be tested
for directly. If many students who should have received scores just below the cutoff receive scores
just above the cutoff, this will result in a hump in the histogram just above the cutoff and a valley in
the histogram just below the cutoff. If no such pattern is evident in the histogram then this provides
compelling evidence that students are not systematically sorting around the cutoff.
Importantly, if a student receives a higher letter grade than their numerical score justifies, this
by itself does not violate the RD assumption in any way. The assumption is not that every student
with a score below the cutoff receives the lower grade, but rather that the scores themselves are
not manipulated in order to fall just above or below the cutoff. At LSRU, professors maintain their
own personal records in addition to reporting official grades to the university. As long as professors
do not manipulate their own personal records, manipulation of the official grade will not invalidate
the RD research design in this application. To determine the likelihood of professors manipulating
their personal records, I spoke with each professor who provided us the data to directly discuss
this issue. Our conversations suggest that the professors in my sample never change the numerical
scores in their own records, but sometimes will change official letter grades based on student
petitions or their own judgement. In any case, if professors do manipulate the raw numerical scores
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(and then later lied to us about doing so), this has the potential to bias estimates and the direction
of this bias is likely in favor of finding a larger impact of grades on major choices. Under the
plausible assumption that those most likely to major in a subject are also most likely to have their
numeric scores artificially raised, the RD estimates will confound inherent interest or motivation
with letter grades and overstate the impact of grades.5 If grading thresholds are set endogenously
to the score distribution, this will not bias estimates so long as the threshold is set independently
of a student’s unobserved motivation or subject interest. For example, if a professor sets grading
cutoffs by looking for “natural breaks” in the distribution, this is will generate a valley on either
side of the threshold, but is unlikely to result in students being unobservably different on either
side of that threshold. Regardless, if endogenous grading scales are used, this will be evident in
the histograms, particularly if professors look for “natural breaks” to determine cutoffs.
Figure 3.1 shows the histogram of numerical scores centered around the B-/B cutoff, which is
the modal score. Since sorting and manipulation might be masked by the standardization process,
the only modification made in the histogram is subtracting the cutoff, which cannot alter the basic
shape of the histogram. Figure 3.1 shows that this histogram of letter grades follow a bell shape,
increasing up until B/B- and then decreasing. In order to look more precisely at humping, Figures
2(a) through 2(i) show a zoomed in version of Figure 3.1, with the histogram of numeric scores
centered around each cutoff. Scores are reported on the original 0 to 100 scale, but are standardized
so that the cutoff is at zero in each figure. The histogram is shown with a bin size of 0.2 percentage
points, but the patterns are not sensitive to displaying other similarly small bin sizes. As shown
in Figure 3.1 the histogram steadily increases for lower grades, peaks in the B range and then
steadily decreases in the A range. Broadly, these histograms show no clear evidence of sorting
around cutoffs, given that the histograms tend to move smoothly on either side of these cutoffs.
The two histograms that are closest to exhibiting a humping pattern are Figure 2(a) around the
D+/C- cutoff, Figure 2(g) around the B+/A- cutoff, and Figure 2(i) around the A/A+ cutoff. In
5We find it highly unlikely that the numerical grades in my sample have been manipulated both because the profes-
sors assured us that they were not and also because the professors have no incentive to manipulate their own records.
The only grade that has any bearing is the official grade submitted to the university so I would expect that pressure to
modify grades would be focused solely on this consequential variable.
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these three figures, relative to the overall histogram trend, there appears to be slight humping to the
left of the cutoff. This is somewhat surprising given that if humping were to occur, I would expect
that students would be pushed just over the threshold, not artificially kept just under the threshold.
Based on the mass of evidence from these histograms, combined with directly asking professors
about manipulation, I conclude that there is no evidence of manipulation of the raw numerical
scores.
3.5.2 First Stage
The RD design requires that the latent variable (numerical scores) impacts the treatment (letter
grades) in a discontinuous fashion. To examine whether this assumption holds, I examine whether
there is a discontinuous jump in the probability of receiving grade X around the numeric threshold
for X. For example, Figure 3(a) plots the fraction of students receiving a letter grade above D-
versus the student’s standardized numerical score. It is clear from Figures 3(a) through 3(i) that
there is a large discontinuous increase in the probability of receiving a grade as one’s test score
crosses the necessary threshold. These figures also show that while a large discontinuity exists,
numerical scores do not perfectly dictate letter grades. As the numeric score approaches the cutoff,
more students are bumped up to the higher grade such that just below the cutoff nearly 20% of
students receive a higher letter grade than their numerical score dictates. Regardless, there remains
a large discontinuity at the cutoff since nearly all students who receive a numerical score above
the cutoff are given the higher letter grade. The fact that numerical scores do not perfectly dictate
letter grades transforms my empirical approach from a strict RD to a fuzzy RD, but the intuition
and implementation of the design is largely the same.
An alternative presentation of the same basic result is shown in Figure 3.4. This figure plots
average letter grades (converted to a 0 to 4.3 scale) against average numeric score (standardized
to the same scale). Each dot in this figure represents a bin of students who have a given numeric
score. If numeric scores were perfectly predictive of letter grades, one would expect to see a
perfect step graph where the letter grade jumps discontinuously at each cutoff and the average
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letter grade in between each cutoff is constant. Figure 3.4 shows a pattern that is close to a stepwise
pattern, but exhibits a very slight slope, particularly as numeric scores approach each cutoff. The
discontinuities are very clear and are particularly stark for grades above a D+.
3.5.3 Second Stage
Given that letter grade assignment jumps discontinuously around grade cutoffs, if letter grades
impact major choices, I expect that the fraction of students majoring in a subject will jump discon-
tinuously around the grade cutoffs as well. As a first step, I simply plot the fraction of students
majoring in the course subject against these students’ numeric scores in the introductory course.
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between major choice and numeric scores. On this figure, the
points that land on a vertical line correspond to students who just barely earned a numerical score
at or above the grade cutoff. If the proportion of students majoring in a subject jumps discontinu-
ously at each line, this would therefore be evidence that letter grades are impacting major choices.
Instead, Figure 3.5 shows little evidence of discontinuous jumps at grading cutoffs. Only the 3.0
(B) cutoff shows a potential jump relative to trend, and the increased probability at 3.0 is not per-
sistent as numeric scores rise above 3.0. Also, the discontinuity at 3.0 is of similar magnitude to
other jumps that occur far away from grade cutoffs (for example near 2.5). On the whole, visual
inspection of the relationship between numeric grades and major choice shows little evidence of
discontinuous jumps which is striking when one compares this to Figure 3.4 which shows clear
discontinuous jumps at every grade cutoff. The combination of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 paint a picture
which is very consistent with the regression results previously presented – introductory perfor-
mance is correlated with major choices, but the letter grades themselves do not appear to impact
major choice.
The results are fairly similar when considering course choices in the three semesters following
the introductory course. Figure 3.7 shows no evidence of a consistent jump in the number of
subsequent credit hours taken as the numeric score crosses letter grade cutoffs.
To empirically estimate the magnitude of any potential discontinuities, I use local linear regres-
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sion.
3.5.3.1 RD: Local Linear Regression
To estimate a local linear regression at each cutoff, I restrict the sample to within 0.25 points
of each threshold and use a rectangular kernel; however, results shown are robust across a number
of bandwidth choices and are not sensitive to the choice of kernel. Specifically I estimate:
Yit = Xiβ + Zitα+ γj + ωCit + δAit + ξ(Cit)(Ait) + ￿it for |Cit| < 0.25 (5)
The variable, Cit is student i’s standardized numeric score for course j with the relevant grade
cutoff subtracted. The variableAit is an indicator defined as 1(Cit >= 0) and the interaction of Cit
and Ait is included to allow the slope to vary on either side of the cutoff. The parameter of interest
is δ, which is the estimated discontinuity. The linear model is fit to only points within 0.25 points
of the cutoff, which ensures that no figure includes more than one potential discontinuity. Figures
7(a) through 7(i) show how major choices change around each cutoff. Each figure plots major
choice conditional on covariates against numeric scores and also includes a note of the estimated
discontinuity (δˆ) along with a standard error taken from estimating equation 5.6 The lines on either
side of the cutoff are graphed based on the coefficient estimates from equation 5 (ωˆ and ξˆ), rather
than from fitting a line to the conditional major choice variable.
Estimating equation 5 on the nine letter grade cutoffs yields no statistically significant esti-
mates. Of the nine estimates, five are negative and four are positive, and none of the figures show
visual evidence of a discontinuity. Furthermore, the point estimates are uniformly small and an or-
der or magnitude less than earlier findings (Owen, 2010). While these results are generally robust
across specification choices, some combinations of kernels and thresholds yield statistically signif-
icant discontinuities for certain thresholds; however, the statistically significant estimates are quite
sensitive to specification and so I do not consider them to be strong evidence of a discontinuity. In
results shown in the appendix, I similarly find no evidence of a discontinuity when focusing just
6The conditional major choice variable is the residual from a regression of major choice on covariates.
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on females in economics as was done in Owen (2010).
Similar to my results for predicting major choice, I find little evidence that letter grades in-
fluence credit hours taken. Figures 7(a) through 7(i) show how conditional credit hours change
around each cutoff. The discontinuity estimates noted on these figures are taken from estimating
equation 5 using subject credit hours taken in the following three semesters as the dependent vari-
able. As can be seen in these figures, four of the estimates are negative, five of the estimates are
positive and none of the nine estimates are statistically significant. The estimated discontinuities
shown should be interpreted as the causal impact of earning a score slightly below the threshold or
the “intent to treat” (ITT). In order to obtain an estimate of the “Treatment on the Treated” (TOT)
it is necessary to scale up these estimates by a factor of approximately 5/4. This accounts for the
fact that the first stage discontinuity is only 0.8 since 20% of students just below the threshold
receive the lower grade. Regardless of whether one considers the ITT or the TOT however, the
effect magnitudes are small, statistically insignificant and inconsistent across cutoffs.
Given that there is no visual evidence of any discontinuities in Figures 3.5 or 3.7 and none of
the local linear regressions yield statistically significant estimates, I conclude that the regression
discontinuity design provides no evidence that major or course choices are influenced by letter
grades.
3.6 Discussion
In their influential 1991 paper, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn develop a model of course choice in
which students derive utility from learning, from their grades and from discounted future benefits.
In their model, while students’ human capital benefits from learning through their coursework,
good grades themselves improve satisfaction. This notion of a direct benefit to higher grades has
informed future research and is supported by theoretic intrinsic and extrinsic factors. In addition
to contributing to a “warm glow of achievement”, many extrinsic rewards such as graduate schol-
arships, academic honors and parental approval are direct functions of letter grades. The result
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from this model implies that students will pursue subjects in which they are best suited to learn,
but this optimal behavior can potentially be distorted by the direct incentive of letter grades if dif-
ferent fields have different grading functions. If student behavior is indeed distorted by letter grade
considerations, then one might expect that two students with roughly the same level of learning,
but different letter grades, would have a different probability of majoring in a field. We find little
evidence that this is the case. Taken as a whole, I believe that the results from the regression dis-
continuity design combined with the regression analysis do not provide support for the notion that
letter grades causally impact major or course choices.
This finding has a number of implications. First, it suggests that if students learn about their
ability through their relative performance in their coursework, this learning is not informed by
the ultimate letter grade earned in the course. Second, this weakens the confidence with which I
can predict the implications of policies being considered at several institutions to equalize grades
across disciplines. Simulations of the impact of letter grades assume a causal impact of letter
grades on major choices and my findings provide some reason to be skeptical.
Owen (2010) finds very different results from my paper in that she finds a very large positive
impact of grades on major choices for women in economics. In the appendix I show that even
when I exactly follow her methodology and restrict my sample to hers, I find no evidence of a
grading impact. There are several possible reasons that my results differ, but none are entirely
satisfactory explanations. First, while Owen (2010) and my paper both examine highly selective
research universities, these universities may have different institutional factors that impede or fa-
cilitate choosing an economics major. Given that neither Owen nor I am permitted to reveal the
institution used, a direct comparison of these institutional factors is not possible. That being said,
by comparing our descriptive statistics, it is clear that these two institutions are slightly different
in terms of who takes introductory economics. In my sample approximately 17 percent of stu-
dents in introductory economics proceed to major in the field whereas in Owen’s sample, only
12 percent major in the field. The average grades in the two samples are comparable and in both
Owen’s sample and my own, 44 percent of the introductory economics course is female. Given that
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both institutions are selective research universities in the Northeastern United States, it is possible
that the impact of grades on major choices is institution or sample specific and therefore further
replications at other universities are necessary to characterize the effect.
A second potential reason for the difference in results is that the institution Owen analyzes
gives grades without plusses and minuses, thereby making sharper discontinuities. While this can
potentially explain the difference in results for the regression discontinuity estimates, it is not a
convincing explanation for why I find such different results in a simple regression setting. We
find similarly large “effects” of letter grades when not controlling for numerical scores but in my
sample, controlling for numeric score eliminates these effects whereas in Owen’s sample, the effect
of letter grades is robust to controlling for numerical score. Furthermore, the sum of my effects
across all 9 grading thresholds is substantially smaller than the point estimate Owen finds for just
the B/A threshold, suggesting that the difference in grading scales at the institution is unlikely to
fully explain the difference in my results. Furthermore, Owen extends her analysis to a liberal arts
college that uses a plus/minus grading system and she finds large effects, directly contradicting the
notion that the grading scale alone explains our divergent findings.
In both Owen’s and my study the true effect that grades have on average major choices is poten-
tially understated because the samples are necessarily restricted to students who choose to enroll
in an introductory course. While these students are the appropriate sample when considering the
determinants of major attrition, they are not representative of students in general. In particular,
one might expect that given that science and economics courses have a reputation of giving rela-
tively low grades, only the students who are least responsive to course grades would elect to enroll
in such a course. Although I find no evidence that these students respond to their letter grades
by changing their course of study, it is very possible that certain students avoid enrolling in the
first place due to a fear of low grades. Students at LSRU are likely well informed regarding aver-
age grades across disciplines since median grade reports are made public to the student body. If
the knowledge of median grades results in only the least grade-sensitive students enrolling in low
grading departments, this might explain why I find no effect of letter grades on major choices for
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my sample. Bar et al. (2009) finds evidence that students responded to the introduction of public
median letter grades at Cornell and to the extent that LSRU students in my time frame are similarly
responsive, the entire impact of grades on major choices may occur through the initial decision of
whether to enroll in the introductory courses.
The regression discontinuity design aims to obtain the causal impact of letter grades by com-
paring two students of similar ability and motivation who received different letter grades. An
interesting alternative exploration is to isolate the unobserved portion by comparing students who
earn identical numeric scores but earn different letter grades. As I argue, a student who earns a
score just below a grade cutoff but receives the lower grade is likely unobservably different than a
student who earns a score just below a grade cutoff and receives the higher grade. This latter group
of students had their letter grades artificially raised and I view this as suggesting that the student
either demonstrated promise or argued forcefully for the higher grade, either of which I expect to
be correlated with a higher likelihood of major persistence. To test this theory, I add an indicator
for whether the students grade was artificially raised to the model given by equation 4. Columns
(1) and (3) of Table 3.5, however, show no evidence that students who are given a higher grade than
their numerical score dictates are more likely to major or take more credit hours. Columns (2) and
(4) similarly show that this relationship does not appear even when allowing for the effect to differ
across the distribution of numerical scores. This result has two possible interpretations and I can-
not distinguish between the two. First, it is possible that grade adjustments are made primarily for
students with extenuating circumstances that are uncorrelated with interest in the major. Second, it
is possible that students do not petition for higher grades differently in subjects in which they plan
to major compared to other subjects. In other words, if certain students petition for higher grades
in all their courses regardless of their majoring plans, this would result in no correlation between
having one’s grade raised and majoring in the field.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the causal impact of letter grades on major and course choices. Contrary
to the broader literature, I find no evidence that letter grades themselves raise the probability of
persisting in a major. As in past research, I document a strong correlation between letter grades
and major choices, but I find that this correlation is explained by a continuous underlying process,
namely course performance. In other words, I find that students are more likely to major in a
subject when they earn high scores in the introductory course, but students who just barely receive
an “A” are no more likely to major than students who just barely miss the “A”.
There exists a large grading gap across the disciplines such that students interested in science
face a trade-off between taking coursework in their preferred field, and maximizing their GPA.
If students strongly respond to these GPA incentives, this might discourage prospective scientists
from pursuing that major. Previous research has found that students strongly respond to these GPA
incentives and thus based on this literature, rigorous grading practices are likely losing the sciences
prospective students. Using an RD design, I find no evidence that students respond to their letter
grades, casting doubt as to whether policies aimed at equalizing grades across the disciplines will
indeed have the effect predicted by the previous literature.
One important question is whether major attrition in the sciences is problematic at all. Science
majors theoretically are beneficial to society because they produce positive externalities and im-
prove our global competitiveness; however, it is probable that the students most likely to produce
these positive externalities are also likely to have performed well in their courses. If poor grades
cause students to leave the sciences, then relatively harsh grading standards might in some ways
be beneficial as a screening device. For this reason, one might hope that students on the border of
A/A+ do not respond to their letter grades, but students who perform at the bottom leave the major
as a result of their low grades. Our results show no evidence of students responding to letter grades
at either end of the performance distribution.
While I find no evidence of a causal impact of letter grades on major choice, it is important
to note that my finding is opposed to the crux of the literature and in particular contradicts Owen
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(2010), a paper that uses an RD methodology at a similar institution. Our results suggest that the
causal impact of letter grades is not as universally supported as previously thought. Future research
should extend the use of this RD methodology to other institutions in order to establish whether
letter grades matter. To the extent that the effect varies across institutions, it would be useful to
understand what institutional factors impact how students’ major choices respond to letter grades.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram Normalized to B/B- Cutoff
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Figure 3.4: Average Letter Grades vs Numerical Score
Notes: Each point represents the average letter grade given to students in a given numerical
score bin. The vertical lines show each cutoff value where 0.7, 1.0, 1.3, 1.7, 2.0, 2.3, 2.7 3.0, 3.3,
3.7 4.0 and 4.3 are the cutoffs for D-, D, D+, C-, C, C+, B-, B, B+,A-,A and A+ respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Fraction Majoring in Subject vs Numerical Score
Notes: Each point represents the fraction of students who major in the subject in a given
numerical score bin. The vertical lines show each letter grade cutoff value where the cutoffs are
the same as in Figure 3.4. Since the bin size is constant and the density is lowest at very high or
very low scores, the variance is much larger at the extremes do to small sample sizes. The outliers
at a numerical score of 4.5 and 0.4 represent very few students and thus these points should be
interpreted with caution.
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Figure 3.6: Credit Hours in Subject vs Numerical Score
Notes: Each point represents the fraction of students who major in the subject in a given
numerical score bin. The vertical lines show each letter grade cutoff value where the cutoffs are
the same as in Figure 3.4. Since the bin size is constant and the density is lowest at very high or
very low scores, the variance is much larger at the extremes do to small sample sizes.
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Table 3.3: Relationship between Letter Grades and Major and Course Choice
Credit Hrs in Subject
Dependent Variable: Major in Subject During Following 3 Semesters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A plus 0.067* 0.008 -0.020 -1.028
(0.027) (0.033) (0.742) (0.863)
A 0.051** 0.009 -0.084 -0.802
(0.016) (0.021) (0.452) (0.552)
A minus 0.048** 0.025 0.724 0.337
(0.015) (0.017) (0.409) (0.446)
B -0.011 0.013 -0.391 0.021
(0.013) (0.015) (0.342) (0.392)
B minus -0.049*** -0.005 -0.442 0.308
(0.015) (0.021) (0.360) (0.503)
C plus -0.081*** -0.014 -0.550 0.592
(0.016) (0.027) (0.391) (0.653)
C -0.106*** -0.015 -1.045* 0.521
(0.018) (0.035) (0.443) (0.842)
C minus -0.127*** -0.017 -1.285* 0.604
(0.020) (0.042) (0.501) (1.006)
Below C minus -0.218*** -0.058 -2.215*** 0.525
(0.023) (0.058) (0.532) (1.340)
Numerical score 0.072** 0.091*** 1.226* 0.859***
(0.024) (0.008) (0.567) (0.191)
N 13,674 13,674 13,674 13,046 13,046 13,046
Incremental F-tests of whether dummy variables jointly contribute to model fit
Incremental F-test: Column (3)→ (2) Column (6)→ (5)
F statistic: 0.93 (p=0.498) F statistic: 1.15 (p=0.324)
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at the student
level reported in parentheses.
Note: The outcome is major choice in columns (1)-(3) and credit hours in column (4)-(6). All regressions
also control for demographics, cumulative and current college GPA, credit hours taken contemporaneously
with the courses analyzed, SAT score or ACT equivalent, an indicator for whether the student listed the
major as their “intended major” on their application to LERU, and a course fixed effect. The omitted group
for the letter grade dummies is B plus.
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Table 3.4: Relationship between Letter Grades and Major and Course Choice (Only Females)
Credit Hrs in Subject
Dependent Variable: Major in Subject During Following 3 Semesters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A plus 0.117** 0.058 1.176 0.371
(0.044) (0.050) (1.128) (1.228)
A 0.027 -0.015 -0.882 -1.450*
(0.024) (0.030) (0.569) (0.649)
A minus 0.063** 0.040 -0.102 -0.413
(0.022) (0.024) (0.534) (0.561)
B -0.019 0.006 -0.745 -0.417
(0.019) (0.021) (0.426) (0.476)
B minus -0.071*** -0.027 -1.332** -0.732
(0.020) (0.027) (0.458) (0.607)
C plus -0.079*** -0.012 -1.093* -0.179
(0.022) (0.035) (0.475) (0.739)
C -0.106*** -0.013 -1.231* 0.022
(0.024) (0.044) (0.533) (0.925)
C minus -0.136*** -0.025 -2.571*** -1.060
(0.028) (0.053) (0.629) (1.131)
Below C minus -0.216*** -0.054 -2.732*** -0.547
(0.031) (0.072) (0.626) (1.463)
Numerical score 0.073* 0.093*** 0.984 0.936***
(0.030) (0.011) (0.616) (0.228)
N 6,953 6,953 6,953 6,696 6,696 6,696
Incremental F-tests of whether dummy variables jointly contribute to model fit
Incremental F-test: Column (3)→ (2) Column (6)→ (5)
F statistic: 1.27 (p=0.249) F statistic: 1.75 (p=0.072)
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered at the student
level reported in parentheses.
Note: The outcome is major choice in columns (1)-(3) and credit hours in column (4)-(6). All regressions
also control for demographics, cumulative and current college GPA, credit hours taken contemporaneously
with the courses analyzed, SAT score or ACT equivalent, an indicator for whether the student listed the
major as their “intended major” on their application to LERU, and a course fixed effect. The omitted group
for the letter grade dummies is B plus. The entire table is restricted to women.
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Table 3.5: Relationship Between Unobservables and Major and Course Choice
Credit Hrs in Subject
During Following
Dependent Variable: Major in Subject 3 Semesters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Numerical Score 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.856*** 0.869***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.192) (0.193)
Letter Grade Was Raised 0.002 0.027 -0.130 0.966
(0.022) (0.077) (0.404) (1.617)
Letter Grade Was Raised x Numerical Score -0.009 -0.395
(0.027) (0.589)
N 13,674 13,674 13,046 13,046
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered
at the student level reported in parentheses.
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